Antariksh Matters: Will Debris-Swallowing Satellites Eat Space Norms for Breakfast?
— Aditya Ramanathan
On the morning of 23 October 2021, a Chinese Long March 3b rocket shot into space, putting a satellite into geosynchronous transfer orbit, the elliptical path into which any satellite must first enter before moving into a geosynchronous orbit.
Under normal circumstances, the launch would have received little attention, but this Long March rocket’s payload was different. According to the state-run Xinhua, the satellite, named Shijian-21, would be “used to test and verify space debris mitigation technologies.” These seemingly innocuous words immediately drew the attention of space-watchers, since any debris removal satellite is also a potential space weapon.
Chinese authorities have not released any details about the Shijian-21. However, in early November, reports indicated that the US Space Force had detected another object, possibly a rocket body component, that was orbiting alongside the Shijan-21 in geosynchronous orbit.
China’s Shijan-21 test is shrouded in secrecy, which is only bound to provoke speculation. However, we must acknowledge that removing space debris is likely to be increasingly necessary and may present commercial opportunities.
How do you solve a problem like space debris?
Space debris is perhaps the most challenging governance problem in orbital space. About 27,000 pieces of debris are routinely tracked. Besides these, there are an estimated 100,000 pieces of debris between 1 cm and 10 cm in size, another 900,000 less than 1 cm and greater than 1mm, and some 130 million pieces of debris that are less than 1mm.
In lower orbits, debris can fly at speeds of 28,000 km per hour or about 7.8 km per second. For reference, a standard 4 gram (62 grain) bullet from a full-size M16A2 rifle has a muzzle velocity of about 853 metres per second.
The problem of space debris is likely to get worse without the creation of clear guidelines to which space actors will adhere. A major culprit is likely to be the planned mega-constellations of low earth orbit (LEO) satellites that are to provide everything from satellite internet to military surveillance. Following the incredibly destructive Chinese ASAT test in 2007, the UN General Assembly backed a set of Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. However, more rules will need to be put in place to slow down the accretion of orbital debris.
In the meantime, some of the debris already in orbit needs to be removed. China is not the only state or entity experimenting with debris-mitigating satellites. In March, a Japanese start-up called Astroscale launched an experimental satellite to test “space debris docking and removal.”
The European Union is also funding a project called RemoveDebris, which seeks to develop a “low cost in-orbit demonstrator mission” that will engage in active debris removal (ADR). According to a description of the mission:
“A microsatellite called here RemoveSAT, will release, capture and deorbit two space debris targets, called DebrisSats, in sequence using various rendezvous, capture and deorbiting technologies thus demonstrating in orbit, key ADR technologies”.
In 2018, one of the experimental RemoveDebris satellites deployed a net at an altitude of 300 km to ensnare a simulated piece of debris. Other proposals include a Chinese one for a laser-wielding orbital craft to burn space junk, and an Airbus plan to harpoon a defunct French satellite.
Of Ploughshares and Swords
Every one of the proposed methods of debris mitigation has obvious anti-satellite applications. Whether such crafts use robotic arms, harpoons, nets, lasers, or kamikaze-hugs that result in de-orbiting, they can all be employed on active satellites. These platforms can also serve an effective coercive function in international politics: the very act of placing a laser-armed craft next to an adversary’s satellite can send a powerful signal and change the adversary’s behaviour. Such platforms are also far more usable than kinetic-kill weapons like ASAT missiles: given the very nature of debris-mitigating technology, using one of them to put an active satellite out of commission is unlikely to affect satellites in orbit.
Today, there are few, if any, dedicated space weapons. Even Direct Ascent- ASAT missiles are largely derived from ballistic missile defence (BMD) platforms. At present, the US Space Force has only one publicly-acknowledged weapon for space warfare: an Earth-based jammer that can target communications satellites. Russia also fields the Tirada-2S, which performs the same function, and China is reportedly developing similar platforms.
While there has been talk of a secret US space weapon, information in the public domain tells us states are yet to turn their space ploughshares into swords. That means any attempt at arms control that seeks to limit hardware is likely to fail at this time. What has greater chances of success are the efforts to put in place norms for behaviour in space. As states haggle over the details in the coming weeks and months, we’ll keep you posted on the developments. Watch this space.
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Cyberpolitik: Blurred Battle Lines on DCNs
— Sapni G K
France is all set to go polls next year, which could prove decisive for the incumbent President Emmanuel Macron. Two days before the final vote during the 2017 elections that Macron won, “Macron Leaks” – a series of materials that accused Macron and his campaign team of committing tax evasion and election fraud. This had limited effects on the result of the polls itself, arguably due to the near-total pre-electoral silence period mandated by French law. The limited availability of time played a crucial part in preventing the spread of these sets of claims. It was later discovered to be a coordinated operation involving hackers affiliated with the Russian Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), its foreign military intelligence agency. The information that was part of the leaks was found to be false information interspersed with select genuine campaign material.
Repeated attempts to orchestrate such incidents, as recent as Russia’s alleged involvement in disinformation campaigns on Facebook in Sudan, is cause for worry in France. Reports also suggest that foreign information operations on social media platforms have been identified in other European countries, including Spain and Germany. Given this background, France is taking proactive steps to reduce and counter politically destabilising events on DCNs. In January 2021, France created an office called VigiNum dedicated to detecting and analysing foreign media manipulation. This office has been functioning under the Prime Minister’s office since October 2021, in consonance with the intelligence services and the election regulator.
Interestingly, French Defense Minister Florence Parly presented a new cyber influence doctrine last month called lutte informatique d’influence, roughly translating into the doctrine of computer influence warfare. According to the doctrine, these are “military operations conducted in the informational layer of cyberspace to detect, characterize and counter-attacks, support strategic command, provide information (intelligence) or deceive, either stand-alone or in combination with other operations”. Under this doctrine, French armed forces are permitted to use social media for information operations, within the bounds of State and international laws. These operations are primarily to “detect, characterize, and counter” adversarial operations, but also to “provide information; conduct deception; or support strategic communication”.
It is amusing to see transparency from a country on Information Operations, while the undercurrents of States covertly conducting these operations on social media and other networked platforms have been around for long. However, with this shift in narrative and transparency, the vulnerabilities of DCNs ( as we have discussed earlier in this newsletter) are evident. They have brought intelligence and war-like operations closer to the ordinary citizen, effectively blurring the line between a civilian and an actor in a military conflict. It also depicts the incapability of large private corporations that operate DCNs to prevent such coordinated operations or take action to protect the users from manipulation. Course correction might no longer be an option for DCNs, as such incidents are facilitated by features that have been entrenched into their mechanics.
With decisive state elections pending in 2022 in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Manipur, etc., these are developments that India should keep a close watch on. Information manipulation campaigns need not be restricted to foreign interference. They can be conducted within the country by vested interests of varying kinds. India must re-evaluate its methods to ensure that free and fair elections can take place without the electorate being subject to information operations. It is time India adopts a defensive strategy for manipulation from external actors on networked information ecosystems, including DCNs. However, ensuring that deterrent mechanisms of the State are not used for information operations within the country is critical. Treading that thin line is challenging but crucial to sustaining democratic processes.
Matsyanyaaya #1: Signals and Signalling from Syndey
— Arjun Gargeyas
Last week saw the world’s first-ever conference dedicated to emerging and critical technologies. The Syndey Dialogue, a brainchild of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), was held virtually from 17th to 19th of November. The presence and the delivery of keynote addresses from key political leaders emphasised the criticality of the dialogue. In the current digital and information age, emerging technologies have become both an intrinsic part of everybody’s lives as well as tools of statecraft. There was a common vision that echoed throughout the discussions at the dialogue: the design, deployment, and usage of these technologies need effective regulations to minimise the harms and maximise the benefits that critical and emerging technologies have to offer.
Shaping global technology governance by democratic states and institutions across the globe was the single point of focus by the different panelists and dignitaries at the event. Finding the right balance of governance in the technology domain remains essential for the betterment of modern society. This can be achieved through the governance of technical standard-setting processes, design principles, ethical frameworks, and legal enforcement of technology legislations. Ensuring all democratic states a seat at the table for creating a uniform technology governance framework remains a primary objective as more technologies emerge that can prove to be economically and geopolitically significant.
The need for democratic states to come together on technology governance was underlined by the challenges technology creates for government institutions. Technology remains a double-edged sword creating vulnerabilities for every advantage it creates. Tackling these vulnerabilities and challenges remains critical for ensuring a safe environment for those using technology as an enabler in their daily lives. The abuse of technology platforms for spreading disinformation by non-state actors has resulted in catastrophic consequences (COVID-19 vaccine misinformation resulted in the loss of many lives) for citizens and has resulted in some states piggybacking on online harms for gaining strategic advantage. There is also the fear of technology abuse by authoritarian regimes resulting in stifling their own citizens’ voices.
The Quad’s recent take on technology has laid the groundwork for democracies around the world working towards fostering an open, accessible, and secure technology ecosystem. The all-important issue of protecting the privacy rights of individuals, especially in the wake of the Pegasus revelations, remains at the forefront of government tech policy objectives. Governments across the globe have the responsibility to keep the internet ‘open’ - away from surveillance and towards an inclusive, transparent system of data flows. The socio-economic influence of ‘Big Tech’ companies raises question marks over the issue of governments’ sovereignty in the technology domain. Basic regulatory practices, specific to the technology sphere, are the need of the hour for finding the right balance between protecting individuals and the industry’s rights.
The Syndey Dialogue was a major step forward taken by technologically advanced states around the world to signal their governments’ intentions of playing a role in presiding over global technology governance frameworks. Emphasis was placed on the fact that certain rules cannot be left to the whims and fancies of private companies. Stress on the need for crucial legislation concerning the utilisation of technologies was signalled through the keynote addresses from major political leaders. The dialogue also underlined the commitment towards organising multi-group forums with the presence of private technology companies, government bodies, and civil society organisations for formulating effective policies concerning technologies.
The lessons from Syndey show the intent of collaboration between democratic states to protect technology and its growth. Governments are now finding it imperative for their presence in the field. The sight of governments taking on an active role in shaping discourse related to critical and emerging technologies is something to watch out for.
Matsyanyaaya #2: Pegging China’s Tech Power
— Pranay Kotasthane
(Crossposted from Anticipating the Unintended — a public policy newsletter by Pranay and RSJ)
If one were to judge the technological prowess of a nation-state on the basis of daily news, China comes across as heads and shoulders above the rest. Hardly any day passes by without reports reminding us that China is well on its path to creating a self-reliant technology industry.
While China’s technological progress is quite real, I want to list three caveats to make you recalibrate exponential growth projections and over-optimistic predictions about China’s tech ecosystem.
1. CCP’s self-preservation imperative
Across many critical sectors such as defence and technology, the CCP exaggerates its capabilities. This strategy is not meant to be just an information operation aimed at other nation-states. It is also a domestic imperative for the CCP, to create a perception that it has things under control at all times.
Projecting control requires demonstrating success. For this reason, CCP propaganda projects promising initiatives by individual companies as world-beating solutions. What we forget is that such reportage is prone to survivorship bias — it overlooks the many companies and initiatives that have failed.
Take the example of Tsinghua Unigroup — which made a lot of news in 2015 for its bid to buy the American memory chipmaker Micron. Once touted as China’s leading chip design house, it has failed to make any significant breakthroughs. As of now, it is reeling under debt, and the government is coordinating its buyout to another player. Similarly, companies such as the Wuhan Hongxin Semiconductor Project (HSMC), once projected to unleash China’s first seven-nanometer foundry, went bust last year. But you’ll hardly see reports about the costs and consequences of such failures.
2. US’ Need to Align Domestic Vectors
The second reason we should be wary of tall claims is that it is in the interest of the US military-industrial complex to overplay China’s technology capabilities. Few things can fire national imagination like a well-equipped, seemingly more advanced adversary.
Just as the Sputnik moment aligned the domestic constituencies in the US and resulted in path-breaking institutions such as the DARPA, overplaying China’s technological advances creates room for prioritising expenditure on key technologies and their governance structures.
It’s not surprising then that the first National Strategy for Critical & Emerging Technologies (C&ET) put out by the Trump administration explicitly cautions against China’s pursuit to become a global leader in Science & Technology.
As an example, consider the debate over semiconductor policy in the US. China’s shadow over East Asia has allowed the US semiconductor industry to make a persuasive case for higher incentives and government support.
3. Opportunity Cost Neglect
A lot of China’s technological success is being financed by governments at the city, provincial, and central levels. While the benefits and successes of these initiatives make news, the costs do not. And as a student of public policy, the first question that comes to my mind is: what is the opportunity cost of China’s governments pouring money, attention, and time into this quest for all-around self-reliance?
Predicting a linear growth path based on current trends misses asking the opportunity cost question completely. In my view, the odds of getting anywhere near the US’ technological capabilities are stacked against China for three reasons.
One, China’s per capita GDP is one-eighth of the US GDP per capita. Simply put, every dollar used in pursuit of one technology goal in China is eight times as costly as a dollar used for the same purpose in the US. With limited resources available, China might well be able to take a lead in a few areas, but the opportunity costs are likely to catch up much before it reaches anywhere near self-reliance.
Two, until now, the opportunity costs were partially being borne by other countries, particularly the US. FDI from the US and uninhibited access for its citizens to the technology ecosystems of other countries allowed China to make rapid progress in key technology domains. That party is now over. The US is now acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage that China enjoyed in the old-world globalisation period. The US has already started putting in place restrictions on the movement of knowledge and capital to China. Under this changed geopolitical scenario, China’s technological superiority is far from inevitable.
Take the example of the recent Alibaba announcement of Yitian 710 - a cutting-edge server chip. The Taiwanese foundry TSMC is the only company that can mass-produce this chip. And there are already murmurs in the US to restrict TSMC from accepting orders from Alibaba on the grounds that this chip can potentially have military applications.
And three, the US still remains a vibrant destination attracting the best tech talent from across the world. Chinese governments, at various levels, can throw money but are unlikely to attract top global talent in the same manner. And in the high-tech domain, skilled labour holds the key.
And so, the next time you come across another technological breakthrough in China, take a deep breath and consider if any of the three factors outlined in this note modulates the hype.
Our Reading Menu
[Paper] Algorithmic Governance and the International Politics of Big Tech by Swati Srivatsava. Perspectives on Politics. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–12. doi: 10.1017/S1537592721003145
[Article] How the Kremlin has weaponized the Facebook files by Jessica Brandt
[Book] The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies
[Takshashila Unredacted Note] about Russia's Direct Ascent Anti Satellite Test on 15th November 2021 by Aditya Pareek and Aditya Ramanathan, who are also contributors to this Newsletter.
#14 Space Debris, Blurred Battle Lines, Hype and Signals