Cyberpolitik: AI and Crime Prevention: Is it a force multiplier?
— Satya Sahu
Crime prevention is based on the idea that crime can be reduced or eliminated by modifying the factors that influence its occurrence or consequences. We can classify “prevention” into three main types: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary prevention addresses the root causes of crime or deters potential offenders before they commit a crime. Secondary prevention aims to intervene with at-risk groups or individuals to prevent them from becoming involved in crime. Finally, tertiary prevention efforts seek to rehabilitate or punish offenders to prevent them from reoffending. (This, however, is beyond the scope of today’s discussion.)
Flipping the coin, we notice that policing is based on the idea that law enforcement and public order can be maintained by enforcing the law and responding to crimes or incidents. Policing also lends itself to being classified into two main types: reactive and proactive. Reactive policing responds to reported crimes or incidents after they occur. Proactive policing anticipates or prevents crimes or incidents before they occur. On the face of it, AI can help us prevent and fight crime by enhancing both types of crime prevention and policing.
AI can digest and analyse petabytes of data from disparate sources, such as social media, CCTV footage, sensors used in our Smart Cities™, and boring old digitised government records, to identify patterns, trends, and anomalies that can indicate potential criminal activity. For example, the police in Vancouver use predictive models to identify areas where robberies are expected to occur and then post officers to deter potential thieves or other criminals. Similarly, the police in Los Angeles use a system called PredPol that generates maps of hotspots where crimes are likely to happen based on past data. These systems can help the police allocate their resources more efficiently and effectively and reduce crime rates and response times.
When it comes to collecting and processing evidence, such as fingerprints, DNA, facial recognition, voice recognition, and digital forensics etc., we can look at the UK Home Office’s VALCRI, which uses AI to analyse large volumes of data from different sources, such as crime reports, witness statements, CCTV footage, and social media posts, to generate hypotheses and leads for investigators. For example, the police in India used ML-backed facial recognition technology to reunite thousands of missing children with their families. Moreover, AI can help the police in presenting evidence and arguments in court, such as using natural language processing to generate concise summaries or transcripts of testimonies or documents.
It could augment efforts to monitor and evaluate police performance and conduct, such as using dashcams, bodycams, or drones to record their interactions with the public and/or suspects. For example, the police in New Orleans developed a program called EPIC that uses AI to analyse video footage from bodycams to identify instances of misconduct or excessive force by officers. It can also help the police in engaging with the public and building trust and confidence, such as using chatbots or social media platforms to communicate with citizens and provide critical information services, hopefully unlike the chatbot from my bank’s beleaguered website.
However, all this has enormous implications for the jurisprudential underpinnings of crime prevention and policing. One such significance arises when AI itself can change the nature and scope of crime and criminality. AI can enable new forms of crime that exploit its capabilities and vulnerabilities, such as cyberattacks, biometric spoofing, deepfakes, autonomous weapons, or social engineering. Unlike their current-crime counterparts, leveraging AI allows these future crimes to be more sophisticated, scalable and anonymous than conventional ones. Therefore, the legal and ethical frameworks that govern our efforts to control such crimes must, therefore, must evolve to address these new crimes. It is a foregone conclusion that without involving AI at the forefront of these efforts, it will be impossible to counter AI-enabled crimes themselves. Hence the concomitant need to update the legal and ethical norms guiding society’s conceptions of policing and crime prevention.
Yet another implication is that AI also transforms the roles and responsibilities of police officers and other actors involved in crime prevention or response. As the examples show, AI can augment or automate some of the tasks that police officers perform, such as data collection, analysis, or evidence processing. AI can also assist or replace some of the decisions that police officers make, such as risk assessment, resource allocation, or intervention selection. To ensure that the concerns of effectiveness and responsibility surrounding Mx. Robo-Cop are adequately balanced, clear and consistent standards and regulations for police and state actors must be established side-by-side with the development and deployment of such systems.
This is not to say that we need to disavow the use of AI in the field of policing and crime prevention. The potential and limitations of AI and the skills and knowledge to use it effectively and responsibly make it so versatile and terrifying. However, it is still a tool to be wielded by the legitimate wielder of the state’s punitive power: the police.
The use of AI in identifying young people who are vulnerable to gang exploitation or violence and mounting efforts to prevent them from becoming involved in crime is already a burning question in the UK. This recognises that leveraging AI to provide better targeted and tailored state support and services to at-risk groups or individuals, is valuable. On the face of it, any enhancements to their state’s performance, efficiency, and accountability in this regard will be applauded. But given what we know about the pitfalls surrounding AI, the opposite also holds: violating the privacy, dignity, or rights of individuals or communities will reduce the trust and legitimacy that is essential for state actors and the police to be able to police under the social contract.
Referring back to my previous post here, we know that AI can create or exacerbate the digital divide or systemic social inequalities among different groups or individuals. The conversation about the use of AI in a field where the slightest deviation from the limited scope of policing is undesirable must discuss the processes involved as well as the outcomes exacted upon the population being policed. This indicates the need to ensure that AI is used in a way that respects and protects the interests and values of individuals or communities. AI is a powerful tool that can help us understand the causes of, prevent, and reduce crime. Still, it is not a substitute for human judgment or responsibility. It is not merely a technology but also a socio-cultural phenomenon to be embraced with a healthy mixture of curiosity and caution.
(I use the term ‘AI’ to include machine learning, Neural Language Processing, etc., here for brevity.)
Matsyanyaaya: Why a local Indian rickshaw app should worry Big Tech
— Shailesh Chitnis
Digital platforms, such as Google and Facebook for advertising and Amazon for e-commerce, derive their power by bringing sellers and buyers together in one place. Over time, "network effects" ensure that these platforms achieve monopoly power in the market. Regulators have tried different methods to limit the reach of these platforms. The European Union prefers a rule-based approach to reining in these companies, while the United States M+A policy is focused on preventing market concentration.
Neither has worked particularly well.
Namma Yatri, a small ride-hailing app in Bangalore, may point in another direction. Since its launch last November, the app lists almost a third of the city's 150,000-odd rickshaw drivers on its network and routes 40% of all rickshaw rides. It is now a viable competitor to Ola and Uber, the dominant apps.
Namma Yatri is unique in that it is entirely funded and run by the community. The app is based on the open-source platform Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC), which is a non-profit supported by the Indian government. A private company, Juspay Technologies create the app, and there is no commission fee.
ONDC's concept is to create a common platform where buyers and sellers can easily transact. This is essentially a technological solution that deconstructs a marketplace (see figure below). By abstracting the platform from supply and demand, ONDC seeks to remove some of the barriers of large digital platforms.
ONDC’s approach is not unique. Last week, Bluesky, a new social media platform backed by Twitter’s founder Jack Dorsey, started inviting users to its Twitter-like platform. What makes it different is that the social network is built on a decentralized system. This would allow, in theory, users from multiple social networks, each with its own systems of curation and moderation to interact.
A technology-driven solution that unbundles a marketplace into different pieces may spur more competition. And given India’s success with pushing large-scale digital infrastructure projects, entrenched platforms should pay attention.
Though it’s early days for these platforms, there are a few questions, particularly around their business model.
- Can a community-supported model work for India when our open-source culture isn’t that well-developed?
- If private companies are developing and maintaining applications on the platform, what are the monetization models?
But perhaps, the most important question is about government intervention. With ONDC, if the government actively participates in defining the protocol and in advocating its use, does that influence innovation and natural market evolution?
Antariksh Matters: Challenges for the Indian private space sector
— Pranav R Satyanath
The approval of the new space policy by the Union Cabinet ushers in a new era for the space sector in India. The long-awaited reform, reflected in an 11-page document, details the activities that the commercial space sector can undertake and delineates the roles of three key government agencies: Indian National Space Promotion & Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), and the Department of Space (DoS). We have covered the merits and shortcomings of the policy in a Takshashila blog.
The enthusiasm for the growth of the private space sector is indeed merited, as private entities were largely denied these opportunities in the past. However, there also exists a host of challenges that the Indian private space sector will face in the future. Some of these challenges are rooted in the historical evolution of the space sector in India, while others are created by the structure of market competition in the space sector. To understand the challenges, we must first briefly analyse how the private space sector has evolved to its present state in India.
Evolution of India’s private space sector
Private sector participation in India’s space sector has historically been sparse. This was because space activities were the state’s monopoly for several decades, and ISRO had achieved several feats, such as developing indigenous launch vehicles with limited resources. Indeed, since space was a high-risk and relatively low-reward sector, private entities stayed away from undertaking entire space projects and instead played the role of contractors and subcontractors for manufacturing satellite and launch vehicle components.
Given ISRO’s monopoly over space activities, a regulatory mechanism to oversee national space activities was seen as unnecessary, even after commercial space activities became a viable undertaking for the private sector. ISRO became the de-facto regulator for the private sector as it was the only route through which the private sector could participate in space activities. The absence of a set regulatory framework, therefore, disincentivised major private sector participation.
This affected the evolution of the private sector in three ways. First, due to the large capital required to establish manufacturing facilities for the space sector, the task of taking the role of suppliers fell on the traditional heavy industries who had large resources at their disposal. Second, since the industries largely followed ISRO’s guidelines on design and manufacturing, they had very little incentives to innovate on their own. Finally, an ancillary support industry or the space sector did not flourish as ISRO imported or manufactured key components in-horse. Put together, these factors would go on to place several structural constraints on India’s private space sector.
The challenges for India’s private space sector
With clarity on the regulatory framework, the private space sector is free to pursue activities in both the Upstream sector (which includes satellite manufacturing and launch services) and the Downstream sector (Ground Segment and satellite services). However, the industry must overcome several hurdles before achieving a high degree of competitiveness. This essay focuses on two challenges that are discussed less frequently.
Support from the government
The miniaturisation of satellites has given rise to a new market for satellite service providers, which has, in turn, spurred the demand for launch vehicles. Despite the boom in demand, the private space sector continues to rely on significant government funding to stay in business. For the NewSpace industry, support from the government comes in the form of purchasing services or directly funding the research and development of new technologies.
Consider the example of the launch industry in the United States. Traditionally the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) purchased services from the established space and missile industry through a cost-plus arrangement. The rise of the private space launch market introduced a new fixed-cost model, where NASA and USAF paid for launches on a need basis. Furthermore, NASA has taken significant steps to involve the private industry in human spaceflight, as the national space agency has shaped itself to undertake high-risk exploration missions. The military sector has also taken major steps to integrate the private industry into the procurement ecosystem, making the government a major source of funding for the private space sector.
Such a model of government funding does not exist in India. According to the new space policy, NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), an entity under the DoS, will take responsibility for operating launch vehicles developed by ISRO. Further, ISRO has also stated that it will develop a new reusable launch vehicle to replace the PSLV. There is no indication that either the DOS or the armed forces will fund private launch providers for launch services or develop new launchers.
Due to the long absence of a commercial space policy, India’s private space industry is in its nascent stages. As the industry matures, it will face stiff competition from well-established international players. In this regard, the Union government must be cognizant of the fact that international competitors have some level of backing from foreign governments, which skews their advantage in the international market.
Access to key technologies
The second major challenge to Indian companies arises from the lack of a robust supply ecosystem in India. As mentioned earlier, the evolution of India’s space sector led to a condition where a supporting industry for the space sector had limited incentives to flourish into its full potential. Decades later, a new generation of space entrepreneurs began to rely on foreign suppliers for key components and technologies as they could not find equivalent suppliers domestically. The lack of a domestic space ecosystem has led several space entrepreneurs to shift their establishments to foreign countries, where access to technology, talent and support systems was easier.
Indeed, the NewSpace ecosystem will eventually gain competence as the domestic industry begins to mature and the demand for domestically-manufactured sensors, optics, testing equipment and software increases. During the transition period, however, space startups will continue to rely on foreign suppliers. The process of procuring foreign components is often a roadblock due to the export control regime on dual-use technologies.
Charging forward
While the new policy achieves high marks in several key areas, the transformation of India’s space sector is far from complete. To achieve the vision of augmenting India’s capabilities through the commercial space sector, India needs a National Space Strategy which charts a clear path forward for both civilian and military activities. Such a strategy must lay down the objectives for India’s space programme and seamlessly incorporate the interests of the commercial space sector into the national strategy.
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[Podcast] Indian Space Policy - 2023 with Aditya Ramanathan and Narayan Prasad
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