India, the US and a Diplomatic Moonshot
The details aren’t fully clear as of this writing, but according to a White House statement, India has signed the Artemis Accords, a US-led framework for lunar governance. India’s acceptance of Artemis is a significant outcome of an extraordinary state visit to the US by Prime Minister Narendra Modi that has already seen multiple deals on high-technology and defence cooperation.
News of the signature will undoubtedly surprise or dismay some in India. But neither of those reactions are warranted. The obstacles that once came in the way of Delhi’s approval of Artemis have been steadily giving way. Also, merely signing on to the accords (which are non-binding) does not automatically mean India will be cooperating with the US’ lunar exploration programme or that it cannot collaborate with other states.
What’s Artemis?
The Artemis Accords came into being in 2020, with eight founding states including the US. On June 21, Ecuador became the 26th state to sign on to the accords. Other signatories include Australia, Japan, France, the UK, and the UAE. Two major spacefaring states that are conspicuous by their absence are Russia and China.
The accords are meant to serve as guidelines for the US’ Artemis programme, which is humanity’s most ambitious space exploration project since the Apollo missions. The Artemis programme seeks to return humans to the Moon for good. In November 2022, the programme made a humble beginning with the launch of the uncrewed Artemis-1 mission that orbited the Moon. The next step is Artemis-2, which will take a crew past the Moon to the furthest humans have been from Earth. The Artemis-3 mission is meant to land two astronauts on the Moon’s south pole for six days (while another two remain in orbit). However, the date for this mission has been pushed from 2024 to 2025 and now 2026. Further delays are possible.
Notwithstanding these delays, the Artemis programme retains its ambitions. Besides new launch and landing systems, NASA and its partners plan to set up an Artemis base camp on the lunar surface as well as a small space station orbiting the Moon called the Lunar Gateway. To make it easier to operate on the Moon, the US also plans to put in place the Lunar Communications Relay and Navigation Systems. Abbreviated as LCRNS, this lunar satellite constellation will both act like a GPS (helping with navigating and time keeping) and as a communication system.
Artemis is also dependent on American private players like SpaceX as well as other national space agencies. For example, both Japan’s JAXA and the European Space Agency (ESA) are involved in providing important capabilities for the Lunar Gateway. The ESA is also developing the European Large Logistics Lander, a spaceship for ferrying cargo between the Earth and Moon.
Artemis Discord
Considering the scale of lunar activities the US envisions and international collaborators it seeks , it is hardly surprising that it chose to come up with a set of guidelines based on existing international law. The set of ten principles are largely unremarkable: the peaceful use of space, transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, registration of space objects, release of scientific data, protecting heritage in space, allowing the extraction and use of resources, deconfliction of activities, and managing orbital debris and safe disposal.
The Artemis principles are largely in line with the four most important international space laws: the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Rescue Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention (1972), and the Registration Convention (1976). All major spacefaring nations including India are parties to these agreements.
Some have argued that Artemis is in opposition to the Moon Agreement (1979), a later treaty signed by states that were not major spacefarers at that time. The US, the Soviet Union, and China did not join the Moon Agreement. India signed on, but did not ratify.
Indeed, some early American champions of Artemis were clearly opposed to the Moon Agreement. Scott Pace, executive secretary of the White House’s National Space Council during the administration of Donald Trump described the agreement as “contrary to American interests” because it called for equitable sharing of benefits from the Moon’s resources. In January 2023, Saudi Arabia withdrew from the Moon Agreement to sign the Artemis Accords. In contrast, Australia, which signed and ratified the Moon Agreement decades ago was a founding signatory to Artemis. Australia has argued that there is no contradiction between the Moon Agreement and Artemis, a line India is also likely to take.
Regardless of India’s formal stance on the Moon Agreement, there are reasons to have some concerns about three out of the ten provisions in the Artemis Accords. Two of these are about protecting heritage in space (such as the Apollo 11 landing site) and deconfliction of activities. While these may be innocuous for most part, they could lead to the establishment of de facto sovereign territory on the Moon, something prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty.
Of greater concern is the extraction and utilisation of resources. In 2015, the US Congress passed a bill allowing the private sector to utilize natural resources from celestial bodies. In 2020, then-President Donald Trump signed an executive order that directed US diplomats to make this an international norm. Unregulated use of the Moon’s resources can lead to its appropriation by major spacefarers at the expense of others. It could also lead to devastating environmental consequences as lunar dust gets kicked up and spreads in an environment with low gravity and no atmosphere.
While these are real concerns, we should note such risks are not imminent. Despite the hype, in the near future it’s unlikely to be economically and technologically feasible to extract the Moon’s resources for use on Earth at any scale. Instead spacefarers will focus on in-situ utilisation of lunar resources to sustain human presence on the Moon. One important resource will be the lunar soil or regolith, which will be needed to build facilities. The other will be lunar ice, which could provide oxygen and water to sustain people, and hydrogen to fuel spacecraft.
Of course, states will need to develop clear norms for the lunar mining and resource extraction. The Artemis Accords do not provide for this, but then, they are not meant to be a comprehensive set of rules. At best, Artemis is a starting point for more detailed negotiations about how we use the Moon.
China and Russia
In 2021, China and Russia partnered to set up an International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), their plan for a permanent presence on the Moon. Russia’s ability to participate in ILRS has declined precipitously following its war with Ukraine, which has led to financial constraints as well as heavy Western sanctions against its space programme.
China has been carrying on nonetheless, outlining plans for short visits to the Moon by Chinese astronauts, and the setting up of a permanent base. Like the US, China also plans to deploy a constellation of lunar satellites to provide navigation and communications.
Why India Hesitated
While Indian officials did not make public statements about their stance on the Artemis Accords, it is possible to identify their concerns. One, the extraction of resources undoubtedly created some misgivings in India as it did in other countries with limited lunar capabilities. Two, India historically tends to prefer formal legally-binding measures in international negotiations over informal agreements like Artemis. Three, some in India may have been concerned that signing on to Artemis would reduce backing for India’s homegrown lunar projects. Four, and perhaps most importantly, signing the Artemis Accords is a clear political signal indicating some proximity to the United States. As a state that values its autonomy, India would only agree to such a move if the benefits clearly outweighed the costs.
Why India is Embracing Artemis Now
It is not difficult to see how India’s hesitations faded away. One, as India’s own space ambitions have grown, it is also considering resource extraction in space. India’s new Space Policy 2023 explicitly allows private companies to “engage in the commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource”.
Two, politics back on Earth make any new overarching international legal framework unlikely in the immediate future. At present, the divisions between the West on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other, have hobbled progress on a variety of issues related to space security and sustainability.
Three, signing the Artemis Accords does not mean India automatically becomes part of the Artemis programme. India can decide the extent of its participation or indeed, if it wants to participate at all. It is likely that growing cooperation between ISRO and NASA in other spheres helped ease concerns among Indian space scientists.
Four, the news about Artemis comes amid a flurry of agreements on technological cooperation between India and the United States. The countries have drawn closer not just because they have to balance China militarily but also because they have to partner in the large-scale efforts to diversify supply chains for high-technology. It is likely India sought concessions from the Americans in return for its Artemis signature. These concessions need not be connected to outer space affairs and might entail important forms of technology or defence cooperation.
What Next?
If India is to have a meaningful role in the Artemis programme, it will have to scale up its budget for space dramatically. It will also need to pass legislation that covers lunar activities to provide a sound legal basis for domestic regulation of space activity.
India’s lunar ambitions need not be US-centric. Indeed, some of the most fruitful cooperation could come from working with other Artemis signatories such as Japan, France, and Australia. Here, India’s Artemis signature would be a help, not a hindrance. Artemis also does not prevent India from cooperating with Russia wherever feasible. Finally, India will also need to push for serious dialogue on lunar governance through both norms and legally binding measures. This is simply the beginning.
You can check out Takshashila’s 2022 Issue Paper on India and the Artemis Accords, in which we concluded it was in India’s best interests to sign the accords.