#xv Beyond Citations | India-Pak escalation dynamics and the nuclear question
Insights on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program from a 2023 study published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
In response to the 22 April terrorist attack in Kashmir’s Pahalgam, India launched Operation Sindoor and struck nine terror targets in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) as well as inside Pakistan during the wee hours of 7 May. What followed was a series of strikes and counter-strikes by both countries. In response to waves of intrusions by Pakistani drones, India struck multiple airbases and radar stations deep inside Pakistan, including the Nur Khan airbase in Rawalpindi. By afternoon of 10 May, India had not just hit multiple terror camps, but also at the heart of the Pakistani military.
Everything was set for a limited conventional war. Until out of nowhere came a post by US President Trump on Truth Social:
After a long night of talks mediated by the United States, I am pleased to announce that India and Pakistan have agreed to a FULL AND IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. Congratulations to both Countries on using Common Sense and Great Intelligence. Thank you for your attention to this matter!
Pakistan soon confirmed the ceasefire. The Indian side later confirmed that both sides had reached an ‘understanding’ to halt offensive operations in air, sea and land effective 1700 hrs after the Pakistani Director General of Military Operations had called the Indian counterpart at 1535 hrs.
There has been a flurry of reports ever since on what led to the abrupt cessation of hostilities. But one potential factor has been the common ground between an unlikely set of actors — international publications and conspiracy theorists of social media. On the nuclear question, the New York Times reported:
One former American official long familiar with Pakistan’s nuclear program noted on Saturday that Pakistan’s deepest fear is of its nuclear command authority being decapitated. The missile strike on Nur Khan could have been interpreted, the former official said, as a warning that India could do just that.
From Kargil in 1999 to Operation Sindoor in 2025, the nuclear question has come to dominate escalation dynamics between both the countries. India and Pakistan fought wars in 1947-48, 1965 and the decisive one in 1971. But since both countries went nuclear in the summer of 1998, conventional wars of even localised and limited nature became fraught with extraordinary risks.
But what exactly is the nuclear risk from Pakistan? What is the status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons?
The following 2023 paper by researchers from the Federation of American Scientists published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists presents a comprehensive picture of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program:
Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda & Eliana Johns (2023) Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2023, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 79:5, 329-345, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2245260 (freely accessible)
Given the paucity of publicly available official information on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, Kristensen et al. complement their analysis by incorporating commercial satellite imagery. They estimate the total number of nuclear warheads to be 170 out of which 162 are estimated to be paired with existing delivery systems. Mirage aircraft are assigned for delivering nuclear warheads via air operations and the Shaheen series for delivering warheads by land-based ballistic missiles.
Unlike India, which has Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) submarines running on nuclear fuel and capable of launching nuclear tipped ballistic missiles, Pakistan’s navy lacks on this front. The latter has tested Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missiles and plans to integrate it with its existing diesel submarines.
What about the remaining eight nuclear warheads?
In addition to the approximately 162 warheads estimated to be assigned to operational forces, a small number of additional warheads (c. 8) are thought to have been produced to arm future Shaheen-III and cruise missiles, for a total estimated inventory of approximately 170 warheads. Pakistan’s warhead inventory is expected to continue to increase.
As far as Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is concerned, Pakistan does not subscribe to a no first use policy like India. Instead, it subscribes to something called full-spectrum deterrence entailing strategic, operational and tactical nuclear weapons as well as liberty to select from counter force, counter value and battlefield targets. The National Command Authority and the Strategic Plans Division are the primary formal bodies in Pakistan dealing with nuclear weapons.
Pakistan’s nuclear program has not just historically been fixated on India, but would continue to remain so in the future. According to the authors:
With several new delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and an expanding uranium enrichment infrastructure, Pakistan’s stockpile has the potential to increase further over the next several years. The size of this projected increase will depend on several factors, including how many nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, how its nuclear strategy evolves, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. We estimate that the country’s stockpile could potentially grow to around 200 warheads by the late 2020s, at the current growth rate. But unless India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will not continue to grow indefinitely but might begin to level off as its current weapons programs are completed.