#iv Beyond Citations | Is Aero India even relevant?
Curated by Lokendra Sharma, Beyond Citations grounds vital tech developments in foundational scholarship. Because academic work is deeply relevant beyond citations in the scholarly universe.
Nearly a week after the conclusion of the successful Aero India 2025 in Benglauru, this edition asks a basic yet consequential question: is Aero India even relevant?
For much of February 2025, fighter aircraft roared through Bengaluru skies first during rehearsals and then for the Aero India held from 10 to 14 February. While there was the usual impressive display by Indian Air Force’s Surya Kiran aerobatic team, it was the first time two fifth generation fighters — US’ F-35 and Russia’s Su-57 — shared the tarmac during an air show. Aero India also grabbed headlines when the chiefs of the Indian Air Force and Army took a sortie in the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas from the Air Force Station Yelahanka. Developed by the public sector undertaking Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the Air Force plans to procure more than a hundred Tejas aircraft to boost its fleet in face of ageing MiG-21, MiG-27 and Jaguar. But the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh is not happy with HAL for the delay in delivery of the Tejas aircraft. Sitting in the cockpit of the HJT-36 Yashas (HJT stands for Hindustan Jet Trainer), the Air Chief Marshal is heard in a viral video sharing his displeasure with the HAL.
But Tejas is only a ‘4.5 generation single seat multirole fighter aircraft’. The Indian Air Force is also seeking to acquire stealth fighters. Aero India saw the ‘unveiling of a full-scale model of India’s first 5.5 Gen stealth aircraft Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) equipped with cutting-edge features’. With President Trump indicating the US openness to sell F-35 to India and Russia offering its Su-57, India faces a choice between its own indigenous AMCA or acquiring F-35/Su-57 or a combination of both.
But are fighter aircraft still relevant? The 20th century was defined by air power, and early success and losses were often decided by which side had air superiority. Does the same hold in the 21st century when drones of all hues are challenging the effectiveness of radar systems and demonstrating lethality in a pilot-less setting? Going by Elon Musk’s views, it seems that this century is different: On 24 November 2024, Musk had tweeted on X while sharing a video of drone formations: ‘Meanwhile, some idiots are still building manned fighter jets like the F-35’.
Should the Indian Air Force even worry about fighter aircraft anymore? Or, should it just focus on building or buying cutting-edge drones of all sizes and shapes? Should the annual Aero India show be about only killer/surveillance drones instead of dazzling displays of roaring fighter aircraft? Have drones revolutionised war?
A 2022 paper published in the International Security journal argues that this is not the case. Drones have not revolutionised wars, argue Calcara et al. in the following paper:
Antonio Calcara, Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Raffaele Marchetti, Ivan Zaccagnini; Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare. International Security 2022; 46 (4): 130–171. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00431 (freely accessible)
Calcara et al. question the exaggerated claims made by analysts and scholars that drones alter the offence-defence balance, ‘strengthen militarily weaker and resource-scarce actors’, and obviate the need for close combat. For backing their arguments, they develop a theoretical framework with hider-finder competition between air defence and air penetration being a key component of the same. They also empirically test their hypotheses by examining three cases in detail: ‘Western Libya military campaign, the Syrian civil war, and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh’.
Based on their analysis of the evidence, they argue that there is no drone revolution currently underway. For them the fundamental principle of air warfare remains the same in the 21st century as it was for much of the 20th: avoiding exposure to enemy fire. The vulnerability of drones to electronic warfare and air defence systems render them incapable of bringing about a drastic shift in offence-defence balance. Drone do not operate in isolation — they require support from a constellation of military systems and highly trained personnel to be effective. This means that drones are not an inexpensive option available to a lesser power, that is, drones do not have a levelling effect on power imbalances. The three case studies also lead the authors to argue that close combat is not going anywhere — it is here to stay.
Their following finding is quite relevant for the Indian Air Force: ‘We conclude that drones can be effective if they are operated by skilled military personnel and if they are integrated with other multilayered and conventional systems (e.g., attack and ISR aircraft, radar and electronic warfare systems, artillery, and ground units).’ Unless rigorous scholarship on the use of drones in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war points evidence to the contrary, the conventional way of warfighting is far from being obsolete. Aero India is relevant, so are fighter aircraft. But as the Calcara et al. demonstrate, air defense and electronic warfare systems are quite important. Amid the buzz around awe-inspiring death machines (aka fighter aircraft), the Air Force should not lose focus on other components of air superiority.
Avoid using word aircrafts. It is only aircraft even for plural.