#98 Is Tech Diffusion the Key to the Rise of Great Powers?
How does technology influence the rise and fall of great powers?; Unpacking the Draft UN Cybercrime Convention
Today, Bharath Reddy provides a brief glimpse into the policy implications of Jeffrey Ding's arguments in the latter’s 2021 paper, “The Rise and Fall of Great Technologies and Powers.” Lokendra Sharma follows this up with a crisp and concise breakdown of the proposed Draft UN Cybercrime Convention and how it may intersect with India’s domestic policy.
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Technomachy: How does technology influence the rise and fall of great powers?
— Bharath Reddy
How does technology influence the rise and fall of great powers? Many studies claim that a state’s ability to lead and monopolise innovation in new and fast-growing industries is a key determinant in leveraging technology to build its national power.
Jeffrey Ding provides an alternate explanation that focuses on the diffusion of general-purpose technologies as the key factor. We discuss the key takeaways from the paper below.
Ding’s paper quotes historian Paul Kennedy on the rise and fall of great powers -
“differentials in growth rates and technological change, leading to shifts in the global economic balances, which in turn gradually impinge upon the political and military balances”.
The paper proposes an alternative theory to explain how technological change leads to global economic imbalances.
Prior work in this discipline has focused on the dominance of a state in new and fast-growing sectors, referred to as Leading Sectors (LS), as a source of national power. A state would be able to achieve a near monopoly on innovation in the early stages of a technology’s life cycle before the technology eventually diffuses and other states catch up.
The theory proposed by Ding focuses instead on the diffusion of general purpose technologies (GPT) over a longer period of the technology’s lifecycle, and leading to more widespread adoption and benefits. With states resorting to sanctions, partnerships, and industrial policies to compete against rivals, these theories can provide insights into the direction interventions should take.
The paper presents three key dimensions in which these theories differ:
Timeframe - In contrast to the LS theory, GPT proposes that the productivity benefits of technology come later in its lifecycle than early on when it might have a first move or monopoly advantages.
The phase of relative advantage: GPT theory places more emphasis on the benefits from the diffusion of technologies into other sectors
The breadth of growth: While LS focuses on domination in specific industries or sectors, GPT diffusion-based growth is more widespread.
The author proceeds to analyse the theory's performance using examples from the first, second, and third industrial revolutions.
For example, machining tools and electricity are great examples of general-purpose technologies that were developed during the Second Industrial Revolution. In both cases, while Germany had an advantage in the early stages of development of the technologies, the US was able to reap far more benefits over the long term. The establishment of educational institutions that offered formalised education related to these technologies and the creation of standards that allowed for interoperability and diffusion to application sectors were some of the key factors for the US advantage.
This theory has some implications for policymaking. Ding testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Some of the key takeaways are:
The US’s lead over China in science and technology is built on strong foundations and should endure. He highlights the need for more balanced assessments of where the US and China stand on science and technology.
Investing in GPT diffusion through education and training is as important as producing the best experts or boosting R&D spending. Technology diffusion institutions such as applied technology centres can help with the wider adoption and application of GPTs.
The theory offers a convincing explanation for technology and its impact on national power, and these takeaways are equally applicable to India.
Cyberpolitik: Unpacking the Draft UN Cybercrime Convention
— Lokendra Sharma
After three years of intense negotiations, the UN member states have finally agreed to a draft convention on cybercrime. On 9 August 2024, the “Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes” agreed to a draft “United Nations Convention against Cybercrime (Crimes Committed through the Use of an Information and Communications Technology System).” As the first UN agreement on cybercrime is expected to be signed and ratified by India. However, aligning India’s domestic legal ecosystem with the convention will be tricky.
Why does the convention matter?
This is the first significant progress the UN has made on cyberspace and internet-related issues in more than two decades. If adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA), it will be the first international legally binding UN agreement addressing cybercrime.
The only other international cybercrime agreement is the Budapest Convention, which was negotiated by the Council of Europe; it opened for signature in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. The Budapest Convention now has 76 parties, including multiple key states outside the European Union, such as the United States, Japan and Brazil. India is not a part of the Budapest Convention. Among the reasons cited for this absence are India’s lack of involvement in the negotiations for the convention and the country’s preference for a UN-led multilateral agreement on cybercrime.
India and the convention: role and impact
India has contributed to the negotiations on the draft convention. In fact, it supported the December 2019 UNGA Resolution 74/247, which was championed by Russia. India is expected to vote in favour of the draft convention in the UNGA this month, especially because India has not expressed any strong displeasure with the convention draft; the draft is also broadly aligned with what India had pushed for during the negotiations.
In 2022, India even made a case for the inclusion of a measure in the draft convention modelled on the lines of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act (IT Act) that was struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional in 2015. Section 66A criminalized sending offensive messages through communication platforms and was claimed to be widely misused according to rights bodies. The Indian proposal to include such a measure in the draft convention faced resistance and was not adopted. India even supported an Iranian proposal to remove human rights protections from the draft convention.
Raman Jit Singh Chima, in an interview with the Indian Express, has raised pertinent questions regarding what this convention would mean for India in terms of domestic legislation. He says that while the draft convention refers to the principle of proportionality, the Indian Supreme Court has laid down in the 2017 Puttaswamy judgment (right to privacy) the considerably more expansive set of principles of necessity, legality, and proportionality. How India aligns its domestic legislation with the convention while also respecting the Supreme Court judgment has to be seen.
What happens next?
The draft convention is expected to be introduced in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) this month (September 2024) during what is called the UN High-Level Week. If adopted by the UNGA, the convention will then open for signing and ratification. According to Article 64 of the draft convention, it will enter into force after 40 states sign and ratify it. The convention may take more than a year to enter into force.
As the draft convention gives broad powers to states as opposed to narrow and well-defined powers that human rights bodies had demanded, it is possible that some states in Europe and North America may face domestic resistance in ratifying the convention. It remains to be seen whether the UN Cybercrime Convention will eclipse the Budapest Convention and whether the “interplay” between both the arrangements play out.
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