#85 A Ticking Clock For Tiktok
Tiktok’s Tightrope; Russia's Cosmic Veto and the Space Militarisation Standoff; A New License for a Post-Open World
Today, Anushka Saxena writes on Tiktok’s existential crisis as it embarks on a legal battle for its survival in the US.
Arindam Goswami writes an incisive commentary on Russia’s veto of a UNSC resolution on the Outer Space Treaty, and Rijesh Panicker rounds off this week’s edition with a concise explanation of the Post Open Zero Cost License.
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Matsyanyaaya 1: Tiktok’s Tightrope
— Anushka Saxena
When TikTok was first introduced to the American market in 2018, it wasn’t because the app was some great success story elsewhere. It was because Musical.ly, a Shanghai-based app with features similar to TikTok, had made giant leaps in the American market. Witnessing its potential, as well as the potential of the idea behind such apps that combined an array of musical backgrounds with user experience and preferences, TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, bought Musical.ly and offered to America and the world a grander ‘TikTok’ experience. Over time, TikTok came to garner not just a massive American audience of 170 million people but also intense criticisms surrounding its alleged connections with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its opaque policies on user data storage.
In recent years, TikTok has become its own brand in a list of controversies overseeing tense US-China relations. Most recently, both the US House and Senate have, with bipartisan consensus, passed a bill which, among other things, urges ByteDance to divest TikTok in America to a local industry/ company within a 9-month period (with a possible 90-day extension, if a deal is in the making at the end of the 9-month period). This bill was quickly signed into law by US President Joe Biden on April 24. The Bill (H.R. 815) itself is quite extensive and covers defence appropriations for Israel and Ukraine, supplemental appropriations for ‘Indo-Pacific Security’, and of course, a division on ‘Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act’, of which the TikTok divestiture provisions are a part.
For those of you who have actively consumed the meme surrounding TikTok CEO Shou Zi Crew testifying in front of a US Congress hearing about 10 times that he is, in no way associated with the CCP, this is what it’s all about – getting ByteDance to either allay security concerns and give up TikTok’s US operations to local vendors, or face a ban at the end of the rainbow. To allay some of these concerns, especially surrounding the storage and access of American users’ data in Chinese servers, TikTok launched a ‘Project Texas’ last year, with a goal to localise the storage of such data in Oracle cloud servers in Texas. This did not appeal to the US Congress.
Now, among other things, Congress has also condemned the potential mental harm the use of TikTok causes, especially to teens or children and the platform’s regulation of misinformation. To both these ends, TikTok’s aggressive policy posturing has been of no avail and has continued to be a challenge for American policymakers. So much so, that one set of bans on TikTok has already been constituted, in that the app cannot be used on federal devices, while individual states such as Indiana have followed suit for state employee devices.
Given that the issue is political, TikTok has not taken it all sitting. In fact, just recently, the company has filed a court case against H.R. 815 with the Washington D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Its lawyers have argued against the divestment bill while framing it as a “ban on free speech rights of 170 million Americans,” as well as unlawful usurping of private property. Further, the suit argues that under equal protection provisions of the law, such a ban should be constituted on other apps too. In a complex geopolitical order, this is a war between national security and legal protection. And if the court proceeds with the case, taking beyond 9 months from now to rule, it may just be the case that the latter wins a small victory, while users continue to “face the music” for longer.
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Matsyanyaaya 2: Russia's Cosmic Veto and the Space Militarisation Standoff
— Arindam Goswami
On April 24th, Russia exercised its veto power to block a United Nations Security Council resolution that aimed to reaffirm the commitments of all parties to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, prohibiting the placement of objects containing nuclear weapons or other forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Earth's orbit. Prior to the vote on the resolution, Russia and China proposed an amendment, which was ultimately rejected, urging all nations to prohibit the placement of any weapons, not just WMDs, in outer space.
Both sides traded charges of hypocrisy at each other. In its remarks at the UN General Assembly, the US alleged that Russia presently possesses various conventional anti-satellite weapons deployed in orbit, including one tested in 2019, and that Russia has issued multiple threats against satellites as potential targets for weaponry, including commercial satellites. They also pointed at Russia's destructive anti-satellite missile test conducted in November 2021, which created numerous fragments of space debris and said that reliable sources indicate that Russia is in the process of developing a new satellite equipped with a nuclear device even though President Putin has publicly stated that Russia has no plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space. Russia, in response, levied accusations against the U.S. and Western countries in general, alleging their intentions for military activities in outer space, including the potential deployment of weapons, notably "strike combat systems."
The veto comes amid growing apprehension over the weaponisation of space, fuelled by advancements in technology and geopolitical rivalries. With an increasing number of countries developing space capabilities, the prospect of an arms race in outer space has become a pressing concern for the international community. These are broader geopolitical tensions surrounding space activities and the lack of consensus on regulating them.
The veto also highlights the limitations of international diplomacy in addressing the challenges posed by space militarisation. Despite widespread recognition of the need to prevent an arms race in outer space, disagreements persist over the interpretation of existing treaties and the scope of future regulations. Russia's veto further complicates efforts to establish norms of behaviour in space and raises questions about the efficacy of multilateral institutions in addressing emerging security threats.
Governments increasingly recognise satellites in Earth's orbit as essential assets, facilitating a range of military capabilities on the ground. Recent instances, such as the utilisation of space-based communications and satellite-linked drones in the conflict in Ukraine, underscore the significant role that space plays in modern warfare.
Similarly, the deployment of space-based weapons systems, such as kinetic kill vehicles and directed energy weapons, has become a growing concern. These systems can target and destroy objects in space, including satellites and other spacecraft. The development of such weapons threatens to destabilise the delicate balance of power in space and could have far-reaching consequences for international security.
Amid the prevailing atmosphere of distrust, even minor incidents have the potential to escalate quickly. Arbitrary, unilateral actions such as Russia's veto or its suspension of participation in the New START treaty in 2023—the sole remaining nuclear arms control agreement with the US—further exacerbate the situation. Progress in resolving these intricate issues is undeniably challenging and requires diligent effort.
In conclusion, Russia's recent veto on the UN resolution against an arms race in space highlights the critical need for global cooperation. As tensions rise, nations must unite to safeguard space for peaceful exploration. Let this serve as a rallying call for collective action to secure the future of our cosmic frontier.
Cyberpolitik: A New License for a Post-Open World
— Rijesh Panicker
Over the past few months, we have seen some significant turbulence in the open source world, from projects like Redis and HashiCorp choosing to move away from open source models to closed or source available models to the xzUtils hack, which very nearly infected large parts of critical infrastructure around the world. This has led to questions around the viability of open source projects and concerns that as more and more firms choose to stay away from pure play open source licensing, we might see a decline in support and contributions to open source projects.
It has become clear that open-source software is reaching a tipping point. Large, viable, and highly adopted projects find themselves unable to monetize their work while competing with large tech firms and choosing limited or commercial licenses to protect their work. At the same time, small projects like xzUtils and OpenSSH that nonetheless are embedded in critical infrastructure find themselves maintained by small, underfunded teams and open to burnout or sophisticated cyberattacks.
A new initiative from Bruce Perens, author of the world’s first open-source manifesto and co-founder of the Open Source Initiative (OSI) seeks to provide one way forward with his new Post-Open Paradigm. He has recently released a draft version (not yet vetted legally) of his new Post Open Zero Cost License which tries to solve the funding problems that are faced by open-source projects today. So, what exactly is the Post-Open License and what will it seek to do?
First, Post-Open is not an open source license but it is intended to work in conjunction with existing open source licenses. Some projects could opt into the Post-Open license in a dual licensing model while others choose to license exclusively under the Post-Open license.
Second, users who choose to join the paid license will pay for more than just the specific products they use. In other words, while they may join to exclusively access Post-Open software, they will also be paying for dual-licensed open-source projects. To protect individuals and small businesses, certain guardrails have been laid out:
Small firms need only pay if they explicitly use a Post-Open project in another product that is being sold or to keep modifications to code private
Large firms (currently defined as more than $5 Million in revenue annually) are expected to pay a certain amount of their revenue (currently set at 1%) for their use of or reuse of Post-Open software.
The key point to note here is that the users will be paying for the entire collection of Post-Open software, not just for the projects they use or reuse.
Third, to ensure fair payment for the developers who have signed up for the Post-Open license, a single organization (to be designed/built) will service all of the developers to share the profit pool amongst developers. This organization will be empowered to act on behalf of all developers to enforce the paid license and ensure compliance, presumably to create some scale while going up against the large firms that are likely to be the potential targets of this license.
There is no question that developers and maintainers of open-source projects need to be funded better, but, is creating a new centralized overlord the right way to go about it? History shows us that any power, especially one that holds the purse strings, will inevitably develop incentives at odds with those it serves.
From a supply-side perspective, this license is at odds with the philosophy that drives FOSS movements and it may not attract adherents easily. From a demand-side perspective, the costs to large firms (1% of Google’s revenue would be about $3 billion) may be large enough to create incentives for them to avoid the license completely. Finally, as more open-source projects become part of critical infrastructure, this license will need to comply with and operate within the limits of several global regulations e.g. the EU Cyber Resiliency Act, which may impact the benefits of the license itself.
What We're Reading (or Listening to)
[Takshashila Discussion Document] A Survey of Chip-Based Hardware Backdoors, by Satya S Sahu
[Opinion] A Self-Harming Stance on Digital Trade Tariffs, by Pranay Kotasthane and Sridhar Krishna
[Opinion] The Belt and Road Initiative at 10: Regional Perspectives on China’s Evolving Approach, by Manoj Kewalramani, Oyuna Baldakova, Margaret Myers, Oscar Meywa Otele and Cheng-Chwee Kuik