#78 The Special Space Edition

Should India Go on the Offensive in Orbit?, IN-SPACe: Donning Many Hats

Mar 21, 2024

Today, Aditya Ramanathan investigates India's need to develop offensive space capabilities. Ashwin Prasad follows up his examination of NewSpace India Limited in #75 with an analysis of The Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre (IN-SPACe).

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Antariksh Matters: Should India Go on the Offensive in Orbit?

— Aditya Ramanathan

India’s military leadership has not hesitated to talk a big game on warfighting in space. While the country’s actual ability to wage warfare in space is modest, concerns about China have driven both the Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chuhan and IAF chief, Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari to call for the development of defensive and offensive space capabilities.

But does India really need offensive space capabilities? Or would defensive ones suffice?

The short answer is that while India’s focus must remain on defensive capabilities, it may need to retain some limited types of offensive capabilities to address specific contingencies.

The Allure of Defence

Defensive capabilities reduce the likelihood that attacks by an adversary will have the intended strategic effect. Defence of space infrastructure can primarily be achieved through resilience, hardening, entanglement, and redundancy.

Resilience is the most important of these capabilities and it simply means the ability of orbital and related terrestrial infrastructure to withstand attacks or other natural disruptions and continue functioning at an acceptable level. Most large satellite constellations tend to be very resilient in the sense that they continue functioning despite some level of impairment. These include global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) like GPS and BeiDou as well as burgeoning orbital internet services like Starlink. Mega constellations of Earth observation satellites are also likely to be able to absorb attacks. Resilience can be further bolstered by responsive launch capabilities that can rapidly insert inexpensive satellites into orbit and thus plug gaps created by warfighting, accidents or natural phenomena.

Hardening can be physical, electronic, or cyber. Satellites can be physically hardened to ward off adversary space objects carrying out rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO). Similarly, terrestrial link and ground stations can be protected by air defences and other security measures. Electronic and cyber hardening help satellite infrastructure withstand or ward off electronic or cyber-attacks.

Entanglement involves sharing or pooling orbital resources with foreign commercial or state entities. This can mean sourcing imagery from a company incorporated in another state, intelligence sharing between governments, leasing transponders on communications satellites etc. The purpose of entanglement is to present adversaries with some of the dilemmas of guerre de course and escalation.

Redundancy refers to the development of terrestrial substitutes for space-based capabilities. For intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), this will involve drastically expanding fleets of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) to ensure coverage and persistence in multiple theatres. For communications this will mean more underground and submarine fibre optic cables, as well as ground and ship-based antennas. While these terrestrial substitutes may not be as effective as space-based capabilities, they reduce the utility an adversary can derive from successfully disrupting or degrading orbital infrastructure.

Some of these measures are evident in the Russia-Ukraine war, For example, Ukraine’s use of American commercial services such as SpaceX Starlink for communications as well as Planet Labs and Maxxar for imagery, are instances of entanglement, as is the use of GPS by both sides. Since these constellations are all difficult to degrade by kinetic means, they are also an instance of resilience.

The Logic of Offence

The underlying rationale of defensive measures is to deter attacks on space assets while limiting the security dilemmas in space for adversaries. However, defensive measures can be victims of their own success. For one, some planned defensive hardening measures may incorporate offensive measures. Proposals for so-called bodyguard or guardian satellites have been floating around for years. While the actual feasibility of such systems is questionable, proposals usually envision patrolling defensive satellites that can employ electronic jamming or laser dazzling to disrupt incoming threats.

Second, and far more significantly, defensive measures seek to turn space into a sanctuary and thus enable offensive terrestrial military operations. For India, this presents a serious problem. Given that China’s superiority in both terrestrial forces and space assets is likely to endure, India has to decide on whether it may be worth contesting China’s use of space during some contingencies. After all, it has been evident China is seeking to use offensive space capabilities to offset the United States’ superior terrestrial forces, especially its ability to project power in the Western Pacific.

Should India do the same with China? There are good reasons to exercise caution when considering this option. Unlike the United States, India shares a common frontier with China. In the event of a localised land conflict along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), both sides will be projecting force from bases of operations relatively close to the fighting. This means there is unlikely to be a large asymmetry in reliance on space-based ISR, communications and navigation. Therefore any mutual degradation of space-based assets is unlikely to leave India in a better position.

Circumstances may differ in a conflict in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). Here China would be more reliant on its satellites to project power and there could be real utility in being able to deny the PLA Navy the use of space. However, since China is likely to be far ahead of India in offensive space warfare capabilities, it can retaliate disproportionately, thus nullifying or reducing the strategic effect India is seeking.

Smoke on the Water

Despite these challenges, there may be moments in which India may choose to initiate offensive space operations. In the IOR, China’s vast range of anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles as well as its aircraft carriers will all rely on space-based ISR to find and fix targets far from Chinese coastal radars and air bases. Indeed, the mere existence of such capabilities could compel Indian surface vessels to disperse when they may need to concentrate to face a Chinese fleet or to offer reassurance to a small Indian Ocean state.

India does have some limited offensive capabilities in the form of direct ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missiles. However, in the event of a major crisis or conflict in the IOR, India may need to mount non-kinetic and reversible attacks on Chinese ISR and communications satellites by employing dazzling or jamming. While these measures would only temporarily disrupt the functioning of Chinese satellites, they can help blunt the efficacy of the PLA Navy, increase the survivability of Indian vessels, and provide Indian leaders with more options.

Of course, any decision to contest China’s use of space is risky. However, crises and conflicts are inherently unpredictable, and any future India-China confrontation in the Indian Ocean is likely to involve unforeseen developments that impinge on vital Indian interests.

At the bare minimum, limited offensive capabilities have the virtue of denying China the confidence that it would be able to use space unhindered in the event of a major confrontation with India. Whatever the exact circumstances of such a confrontation may be, India has good reason to retain some offensive capabilities that can be unsheathed on a particularly bad day in the years to come.

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Antariksh Matters: IN-SPACe: Donning Many Hats

— Ashwin Prasad

On 24 June, 2020, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi approved landmark space reforms meant to encourage private sector participation in the Indian space sector. As India’s private space sector began to grow, the Indian government released the Indian Space Policy in 2023 to offer more clarity about its vision and regulatory stance. Several governmental entities, including the Department of Space (DoS), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), and NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), have new roles as part of the reforms. However, the most important role is that of a new body - The Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre (IN-SPACe) created for this purpose.

Structure and Function

IN-SPACe is an autonomous body under the DoS that acts like a one-stop-shop for the space industry. It's a team of 12 members made up of bureaucrats, industry experts, academia, and government officials. They have different departments, including the Promotion Directorate, Program Management and Authorisation Directorate, Technical Directorate, and the Legal, Finance, and Administrative Wing. IN-SPACe has two main roles; being a regulator and a promoter.

Regulation

As the regulator for the space sector, IN-SPACe is responsible for authorizing all space activities by players, including the government. Its primary responsibility is to ensure that these activities, which include the building of launch vehicles, satellites, ground stations, and data dissemination, adhere to safety, national security, international obligations, and foreign policy considerations.

IN-SPACe serves as a single-window interface for inter-departmental coordination with several other departments and ministries, such as the Department of Space, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Department of Telecommunication, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of External Affairs. The Standing Committee for Inter-Ministerial Coordination, which comprises members from these departments, reviews and recommends authorisations for applications that require scrutiny from the respective departments and ministries.

To facilitate a paperless procedure for non-government entities to submit applications and gain approvals, IN-SPACe established a digital platform in 2022, and it has received over 450 applications so far.

Promotion and Enablement

IN-SPACe has also been tasked with promoting and developing the ecosystem and assisting non-government entities in the sector. It has taken on this challenge by undertaking varied and numerous initiatives and projects.

IN-SPACe has to ensure a level playing field in using all facilities and remote sensing data created using public funds. A Price Support Policy has been implemented to offer technical support from ISRO to the private sector and Earth Observation Data from ISRO Satellites.

IN-SPACe works with industry and academia to enable linkages. A total of 50 MoUs have been signed to date with non-governmental entities. To create awareness among academia, it has formed a National Committee for Adoption of Space Technology Education in India. IN-SPACe is partnering with the DoS and the MEA to establish connections between the Indian and foreign space industries. IN-SPACe has already conducted roundtable meetings with Australia, Italy, and Luxembourg and plans to collaborate with more countries in the future.

In-SPACe promotes industry clusters, manufacturing hubs and incubation centres. Start-ups can receive up to 1 crore seed fund assistance for funding, training, mentorship, and networking opportunities. IN-SPACe has established a Design Lab and a Technical Centre with computing facilities, test labs and clean rooms that start-ups can use for their mission planning needs.⁶ IN-SPACe is collaborating with various states in India to develop industry clusters. One such recent collaboration was with Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited (TIDCO) to establish a space industrial and propellants park. Another partnership is with Gujarat to construct a space manufacturing park.

IN-SPACe also facilitates technology transfers to non-governmental entities. Fifteen technologies developed by ISRO have already been transferred to private companies. Private companies can apply for technology transfer through the website. IN-SPACe is also in the process of transferring the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) technology to the private industry. This is a rare instance of a space agency transferring the full design of a launch vehicle to the private sector.

Strategies for Improvement

Establishing IN-SPACe is a positive step towards achieving the broader vision of space reforms. The principles behind this move align with the government's goals of self-reliance and promoting Indian manufacturing. The efforts of the government, IN-SPACe, and the private sector have resulted in a significant increase in the number of space start-ups operating in India, which has risen from one in 2012 to close to 200 in 2023. Investments in the Indian space sector have also increased from $6 million in 2019 to $125 million in 2023.

To make IN-SPACe more effective, the government must provide it with a certain degree of independence and separation. Although IN-SPACe is currently responsible for promoting and regulating, these two opposing mandates need to be separated. One way to achieve this would be to split IN-SPACe's various directorates into regulatory and promotional groups. The regulatory half must get statutory backing outside the DoS, while the other continues to operate under the DoS. Moreover, an adjudicatory body must be established under the same act to handle appellate functions.

Regarding the sharing of facilities, ISRO's schedule is already quite full, leaving little room for private entities to use the facilities. IN-SPACe's prioritisation procedures should ensure private companies get adequate access to these facilities. The government can build additional spaceports while IN-SPACe continues to set up more technical centres and laboratories.

Governments of nations with successful private space industries have acted as anchor customers. Additionally, mechanisms for risk-sharing in case of risky projects are necessary. IN-SPACe is well-positioned to act as a nodal agency to coordinate between ISRO, NSIL, and the private industry. This coordination can facilitate procurement processes that enable ISRO or the government to enter into contracts and agreements as per its requirements. Such processes can be of immense help to private space companies for investing in research and development and developing independent intellectual property.

What We're Reading (or Listening to)

[Opinion] Navy is showing its mettle in the Indian Ocean Region, Yusuf T Unjhawala

[Opinion] Building supply chain resilience in telecommunications: the Quad’s role in accelerating open RAN adoption, Bharath Reddy

[Article] Cross-Straits Relations Have Become More Dynamic and Volatile – Here are Four Reasons Why, by Anushka Saxena