#64 The Risks of Restricting RISC-V
The Futility of Restricting RISC-V, Nuclear Energy in Vogue at COP28, An Indian Moonshot & Orbital Habitat?
Today, we spotlight some US policymakers’ proposals to cut off Beijing’s access to RISC-V by extending chip export controls to the open-source standard.
Also this week:
Nuclear Energy at COP28
India’s Spaceflight Goals
Course Advertisement: Admissions for the Jan 2023 cohort of Takshashila’s Graduate Certificate in Public Policy (Technology and Policy) programme are now open! Visit this link to apply. Apply by 3rd Dec 2023 to avail the early bird scholarship!
CyberPolitik: The Futility of Restricting RISC-V
— Satya Sahu
As the US intensifies efforts to curb China's rapid ascendancy in the semiconductor arena, a pivotal question emerges: can restricting access to open-source hardware like RISC-V (an open-source ISA) effectively thwart China's chip-making prowess?
RISC-V (Reduced Instruction Set Computer), developed at the University of California, Berkeley, is essentially a set of instructions that specify what a processor can do and how it gets things done. It is offered royalty-free to anyone by RISC-V International, a non-profit comprising member companies worldwide that contribute to and manage the standard. Its openness has catalysed a wave of innovation, democratising chip design and enabling countries and companies to reduce reliance on dominant, proprietary chip technologies. It has, therefore, seen widespread adoption globally, with chipmakers across continents, including the USA, Europe, India, China, and Japan, actively engaging in the RISC-V ecosystem.
By its very definition, open-source technology like RISC-V is collaborative and borderless. Imposing restrictions on something inherently designed to be unrestricted is also antithetical to the spirit of open-source innovation.
The US’ Case for Restricting Access
This innovation also works to the benefit of US-based entities commercialising RISC-V, like Nvidia and SiFive. However, the argument could be made that the strategic objective of the controls outweighs the economic costs. As the Select Committee on the CCP suggest, the proposition of applying export controls to RISC-V stems from concerns over national security and technological supremacy. These concerns have been amplified after the apparent Chinese breakthrough in manufacturing 7nm SoCs, well after the October 2022 export controls were in place. The fear is that China, leveraging RISC-V, could eventually circumvent US dominance in semiconductor technology, thus bolstering its military and technological capabilities.
And the Potential Downsides…
The proposal has been met with concern about its broader implications for global technological development. RISC-V has been a product of international collaboration. Restricting its access could hamper the progress and development of the ISA standards, associated technologies, and its software ecosystem, which relies on contributions from a diverse community of developers worldwide. A US-centric clampdown would isolate American entities from this thriving ecosystem, depriving them of access to potential improvements and innovation from a sizeable section of the globe.
RISC-V International's CEO, Calista Redmond, has argued that such unprecedented restrictions in open standards could lead to a world of incompatible solutions, duplicating efforts and closing off markets. This would not only diminish access to global products, solutions, and talent but could also bifurcate technological development, creating a fragmented landscape contrary to the collaborative spirit of open-source innovation. It could also directly lead to a chilling effect on contributions from collaborators globally due to the potential of falling afoul of US controls and attracting legal liability.
Several Chinese companies, including major players like Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu, have accelerated the development of homegrown RISC-V silicon and Intellectual Property as a way to insulate their supply chains from US trade sanctions. This might indicate that export controls would incentivise China to invest more heavily in developing an indigenous implementation of a RISC-V ecosystem, thereby reducing its reliance on Western software and hardware. At the same time, if China markets this ecosystem to countries where it already provides 5G and telecom services, it could potentially reduce the number of markets available for US firms and other global players seeking to create their own commercial implementations of RISC-V, given the likelihood of a lack of interoperability post bifurcation.
A Different Way Forward?
Rather than imposing limits on the proliferation of RISC-V, establishing standards for RISC-V usage via global partnerships like the Chip 4 Alliance, for instance, could go a long way to balance open innovation with security concerns and can be an avenue through which the members within the RISC-V consortium can represent these US interests.
Unlike physical goods, policing the transfer of knowledge and information, especially in the digital age, is fraught with complexities. Implementing export controls on intangible technological standards poses significant legal and enforcement challenges when diversion risks exist, making the controls largely symbolic. Attempting to stop the blanket proliferation of the open-source ISA is an ineffective measure at best. Hopefully, any such attempt by the US focuses instead on implementing targeted measures on specific RISC-V applications with direct national security implications to strike a middle ground vis-a-vis innovation.
Matsyanyaaya: Nuclear Energy in Vogue at COP28
— Saurabh Todi
The 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is scheduled from November 30 to December 12, 2023, at Expo City, Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. This COP is particularly important as it marks the conclusion of the first Global Stocktake, a comprehensive assessment of the progress made in achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.
One significant development has been that nuclear energy is expected to become a major talking point at the summit. Bloomberg reports that the US will advocate for significantly increasing nuclear power globally, aiming to at least triple the global nuclear power capacity by 2050. Countries like the UK, France, Sweden, Finland and South Korea reportedly support this move by the US. Others might join as the summit nears. The proposed declaration will call on the World Bank and other international financial institutions to include nuclear energy in their lending policies, a significant departure from the current policy of not financing nuclear energy projects.
This development is another addition to a series of developments over the last few years that indicate a resurgence of nuclear power in global energy policy, largely due to the surge in energy costs stemming from the eruption of the Ukraine war last year. Four months after the conflict began, the European Parliament voted to categorise some nuclear projects as "green," recognising their importance in reducing emissions.
Countries, including South Korea and Japan, that had been planning to phase out nuclear power are now reconsidering. Over 60 nuclear reactors are currently under construction across 15 countries.
If this declaration succeeds in changing the policy of the World Bank or other multilateral lending institutions, it would mark a renaissance in the nuclear power industry. We are also expected to see intense competition for export markets between countries like South Korea, the United States, France, and Russia. Elevated concerns about proliferation risks, especially with candidates like Saudi Arabia, are bound to follow. In any case, it is worth keeping track of regulatory changes that facilitate greater adoption of nuclear energy.
Antariksh Matters: An Indian Moonshot & Orbital Habitat?
— Aditya Ramanathan
**This post is adapted from a new Takshashila Discussion Document titled “Human Spaceflight: Indian Goals & Global Ambitions”. Click here to read the full document.**
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made news on 17 October 2023 after he set deadlines for two human spaceflight endeavours. Addressing Department of Space (DoS) officials, Modi said India should have a “Bharatiya Antariksha Station” or Indian Space Station in orbit by 2035 and send the first Indian to the Moon by 2040.
These are extraordinary aims for India’s space programme, which has traditionally been focused on space applications. While the Gaganyann project for a human-rated orbital spacecraft has been in the works for years, and ISRO chiefs have hinted that a space station is the logical next step, Modi’s announcement will push India’s space agency, ISRO, to pursue these goals at a quicker pace.
To achieve these goals, India must embed its human spaceflight goals into the effort to build a commercially sustainable low-Earth orbit economy. It must also join the US-led Artemis lunar exploration programme to accelerate its journey to putting a person on the Moon.
Achieving India’s Human Spaceflight Ambitions
Based on the limited information available in the public domain, India appears to be following a human spaceflight path similar to China’s. The steps include perfecting orbital human spaceflight (through the Gaganyaan programme), building one or more small space stations before graduating to a larger modular outpost, and pursuing uncrewed lunar sample return missions to gain some of the experience needed to send people to the Moon.
However, China’s circumstances are very different from India’s. For one, China’s space budget is much higher, estimated at about $12 billion in 2022, compared to ISRO’s official budget estimate of $1.64 billion in the financial year 2022-23. While these figures may not be exactly comparable, they indicate the differences in budgetary support available for ambitious space missions.
Two, China has a single spacefaring partner: Russia. While Russia’s Roscosmos has formidable capabilities and experience, it remains financially constrained and lacks easy access to foreign technology.
For China, independent development of its space programme is more a necessity than choice. On the other hand, India not only has a history of partnering with Roscosmos but is also witnessing growing cooperation with NASA, JAXA, and the ESA. If divisions between China and other states heighten in the coming decade, the incentive for cooperation will only increase.
Three, the growing prominence of commercial actors in the space sector provides India the opportunity to grow its own space industry. While ISRO has historically engaged in vendor-level agreements with several private sector companies, it will need to encourage both established players and startups to move up the value chain.
In summary, India must seek international cooperation to (1) gain experience and access to technology and (2) seek commercial opportunities that can help reduce the budgetary burden of human spaceflight. To achieve this, India must do the following:
1. Firmly embed the Gaganyaan and Bharatiya Antariksha Station projects into plans for developing a commercial low Earth orbit economy. As discussed earlier, at least two commercial players, Blue Origin and Voyager Space, have shown interest in using the Gaganyaan capsule for crew transport to their planned stations. ISRO can leverage these collaborations to gain access to commercial space stations and thus provide experience to Indian crews.
2. Encourage joint ventures between Indian and foreign companies pursuing projects related to both low Earth orbit and lunar exploration. Indian engineering talent, cost advantages, and ISRO’s space facilities can help build Indian expertise and intellectual property.
3. India must join the Artemis programme to meet its goal of putting a human on the Moon by 2040. In June, India decided to sign the Artemis Accords, a series of principles on lunar conduct that are a pre-requisite for joining the Artemis programme. Signing the accords does not obligate India to join the US-led drive to return to the Moon. However, joining the Artemis programme can provide both ISRO and Indian commercial actors with new opportunities and learnings.
While the steps outlined above are unprecedented for India’s historically state-led space programme, Indian leaders and officials must adapt to the new realities of human spaceflight if they wish to accomplish their ambitious goals.
What We're Reading (or Listening to)
[Podcast] Decoding global semiconductor geopolitics and India’s strategic options | The Hindu On Books podcast, ft. Pranay Kotasthane and Abhiram Manchi
[Takshashila Discussion Document] Takshashila Discussion Document - Human Spaceflight: Indian Goals & Global Ambitions, by Aditya Ramanathan
[Opinion] What’s in the New Amendments to China’s State Secrets Law? , by Anushka Saxena