#50 Hopeful Research Outcomes and Indigenous Telecom Ambitions.
National Research Foundation: A Good First Step, China’s attempts to nickel-and-dime Indonesia’s Nickel, Are India’s 6G Ambitions Realistic?, Towards a Consistent Policy on Online Content Moderation.
Starting next week, we are making a few changes to TechnoPolitik; expect to see regular briefs and updates tracking recent tech and geo-political developments in upcoming editions, as well as more long-form articles ruminating on interesting areas. Also keep your eyes peeled for special editions every other weekend! If you would like to contribute to TechnoPolitik, reach out to us at satya@takshashila.org.in .
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CyberPolitik Brief : National Research Foundation: A Good First Step
— Shambhavi Naik and Saurabh Todi
The Cabinet assent to the National Research Foundation (NRF) Bill paves the way to implement India’s most extensive government programme to fund research in the country. India’s gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) is currently 0.6-0.8% of GDP, which is relatively low compared with that of the US (3.36%), China (2.14%), and Israel (4.9%). A significant infusion of funding, steered by a clear implementation strategy, is required for India to become a science leader. The NRF promises to be the vehicle to facilitate this transformation.
Although better clarity on the structure and function of NRF will emerge once the bill is tabled in the parliament and is available for public scrutiny, these aspects revealed in the PIB press release are worth noting. The fact that the Prime Minister is proposed to be the ex-officio President and the Union Minister of Science & Technology & Union Minister of Education as the ex-officio Vice-Presidents provides political heft to the organisation. It could cut through the red tape that currently plagues the research and development bureaucracy. Furthermore, an Executive Council chaired by the Principal Scientific Adviser (PSA) to the Government of India will govern the administrative functioning of the NRF. This proposal is exciting as the Office of the PSA comes under the Cabinet Secretariat. So, the likelihood of improved inter-ministerial coordination essential for the smooth function of NRF increases.
If appropriately implemented, the proposed NRF might be the shot in the arm that the Indian research and development ecosystem needs. We will be watching for specifics of the proposed NRF and highlighting gaps once the bill is tabled in the parliament.
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Cyberpolitik Explainer : China’s attempts to nickel-and-dime Indonesia’s Nickel
— Bharat Sharma
Indonesia is investigating the possibility of illegal exports of nickel ore to China. This piece discusses Indonesian nickel and its rise and importance to China, especially in an emerging global chip war.
Nickel is widely used in making stainless steel, but most critically is an essential component in electric vehicles (EVs), automobiles believed to catapult us into a net-zero space.
Nickel is vital to lithium-ion batteries that power EVs worldwide; nickel allows better driving range. And because any discussion of a global transition to EVs involves a sustainable and effortless transition for potential EV users–who worry about better driving range–nickel has assumed importance in the energy transition. (For instance, 90% of the cathode used in EVs is nickel.)
Indonesia has the globe’s largest nickel reserves, tied with Australia–a simple fact that policymakers in Jakarta understood was that the intensive use of nickel in lithium batteries baldly meant that Indonesian nickel reserves would be central to energy-intensive supply chains that the world was increasingly moving towards.
In January 2020, Indonesia banned any foreign takers of its nickel ore–the reserves mainly concentrated in Sulawesi–a phenomenon analysts have called ‘resource nationalism’. It involves (and has involved) governments dominating strategic metal industries.
This move by the government led to higher investments in setting up nickel industries to do onshore processing, which has made Indonesia’s nickel exports jump from $3 billion to $30 billion in two years. Estimations make it likely that from 2022 to 2029, Indonesia’s nickel production will account for more than 75% of the global supply.
China has heavily invested in the Indonesian metal sector. By the end of 2022, China had invested $3.2 billion, totalling $14.2 billion over the past ten years.
China uses nickel the most but only has 5% of the world’s nickel reserves and is the world’s largest producer and consumer of stainless steel, EVs and batteries. It also leads to nickel demand, which is expected to pick up and reach 4.3 million tonnes by 2028. So that creates Chinese dependence on Indonesia; what kind and the extent of the dependency is undoubtedly worthy of deeper study.
Therefore, this area is worth watching as the U.S., Japan, and Netherlands step up export restrictions for critical technology and hardware. The key question is this: what will Indonesia do with its sprawling command over metal in a multi-polar world?
Cyberpolitik : Are India’s 6G Ambitions Realistic?
— Manoj Harjani
Earlier this year, India’s Department of Telecommunications (DOT) published a vision statement for 6G outlining a desire to implement the next generation of communications networks by 2030.
The vision statement – which draws on the recommendations of six taskforces formed by the DOT in late 2021 – lays out an ambitious plan for India to make its mark by contributing to global 6G technology research and standards and manufacturing equipment domestically.
Yet the reality is that India’s rollout of 5G has been slower than expected, and the country would be venturing into indigenously developing a technology in which it has relatively limited prior experience and capabilities.
Are India’s 6G ambitions realistic? While striving towards growing domestic technological capabilities is laudable, it is a myth that any one country can independently develop 6G indigenously.
To ensure an optimal 6G rollout in future that avoids the delays seen with 5G, the government will have to balance technical, commercial and national security concerns through a risk-based approach.
Obstacles to India’s 6G Vision
India’s journey towards 6G has gotten off to a good start. The DOT’s six multi-stakeholder taskforces have covered many factors related to nurturing the 6G ecosystem, including the technologies necessary to realise next-generation networks, spectrum policy, use cases, devices, standardisation, and R&D finance.
This is a significant step since India had paid limited attention to indigenous technology development and contributed to international standardisation prior to 4G and 5G. Having developed a vision statement, India is now situated within a small club of countries involved in finalising technology standards for 6G. However, this does not guarantee influence over the outcome.
However, there will be a significant obstacle to navigate when it comes to R&D. India’s overall R&D expenditure as a proportion of GDP only stands at 0.7% – far below the global average of 1.8% – but such indicators are subject to a time lag and inaccuracies in measurement, particularly for private sector contributions.
While the DOT’s task force on R&D finance has recommended creating a funding pool of ₹10,000 crore over ten years, it is unclear how this will be realised and the extent of the government’s contributions relative to that of the private sector.
The task force’s recommendation is within range of the funding commitments made by other major players involved in 6G development. For example, the European Union’s budget is approximately €1.8 billion (~₹16,000 crore) from 2021 to 2027, while Japan and the United States jointly committed to spending US$4.5 billion (~₹37,000 crore) in 2021.
Beyond R&D, another critical obstacle will be manufacturing the full suite of 6G equipment domestically. The government took the first step towards encouraging indigenisation when it banned the use of ‘non-trusted’ equipment for India’s communications networks in July 2022. This has effectively ruled out participation by key Chinese equipment makers Huawei and ZTE in India’s 5G network and future 6G rollout as they have yet to receive ‘trusted’ status.
Nevertheless, it will take some time before supply chains and manufacturing capabilities adjust, and even then, it will be unlikely that India can completely indigenise the supply chain for 6G. For example, there are no significant local players in the design and production of 5G chips, and it is doubtful that India can develop this capability for 6G by 2030, given the complexities of breaking into the chip industry.
In light of these circumstances, the government’s claim of having a fully indigenised technology stack needs to be unpacked further. The ‘India Telecom Stack’ developed by a consortium of local companies will primarily serve state-owned telco BSNL in its rollout of 4G services and eventually for non-standalone 5G services.
But the core equipment of the India Telecom Stack – based on the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) architecture developed by a global alliance of major telcos – relies on foreign intellectual property. This underscores the fact that no single country or company will independently develop every aspect of 6G technology – complete indigenisation is, therefore a myth.
Telcos clearly recognise this reality, which is why those that have already rolled out 5G services in India have done so with a mix of local and foreign equipment. For example, Reliance Jio partnered with European equipment manufacturers Ericsson and Nokia, even though it initially promised to deliver a fully indigenised 5G network.
Cautious optimism?
Despite these obstacles, the government’s launch of a 6G ‘mission’ to realise its vision statement is a step in the right direction. Creating a multi-stakeholder institutional setup can serve India well if it is mobilised towards minimising bureaucracy and creating a conducive regulatory environment for R&D.
The primary stumbling block is likely to be ideological. Anchoring the 6G mission to ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ may bolster India’s techno-nationalist credentials but could result in a sub-optimal and delayed 6G rollout if domestic R&D and manufacturing capabilities are not able to ramp up and deliver within the 2030 timeframe.
Advocates of developing 6G technology indigenously on the basis that it is essential to safeguard national security are also missing the forest for the trees. Not only does India have the option to procure from trusted foreign suppliers, there is no guarantee that domestically-manufactured equipment is free from security risks.
In any case, given the limitations that exist for developing truly indigenised 6G technology, a more pragmatic option for the government is a risk-based approach. Where there are genuine national security risks – for example, through software or hardware backdoors – the case for greater oversight of the technology supply chain is clearer.
For areas with minimal risks, the government should avoid the temptation to produce indigenously and consider trusted foreign suppliers. Ultimately, the most critical capability that will be needed to ensure a timely and effective 6G rollout is sensitivity to balance technical, commercial and national security concerns.
***
The author is a Research Fellow with the Military Transformations Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, and a student of Takshashila’s GCPP (Technology & Policy) Programme.
Matsyanyaaya Explainer : Controlling Networks: Towards a Consistent Policy on Online Content Moderation
— Abhishek Pisharody
The Problem
Twitter founder Jack Dorsey recently went public with his concerns about the Indian Government issuing takedown requests targeting specific tweets and accounts for various reasons. Under Elon Musk, Twitter has complied with 808(83%) of the 971 government requests received. This marks a substantive upward trend in both requests and approval rates, which previously stood at 338 and 50%, respectively. Dorsey also notes a commensurate rise in the consequences for non-compliance, citing government threats of withholding access to Twitter entirely or raiding the homes and offices of Twitter employees. Acceding to the requests to remove user content, however has been met with criticism from international media, who question Twitter’s commitment to free speech.
This raises interesting questions about information control in radically networked societies. A web of hyper-connected individuals characterizes a radically networked society with a common identity, capable of rapid dissemination of information and swift mobilization. Social interactive platforms facilitate this by powerfully amplifying citizens’ voices, creating movements and organizing indigenous resistance to challenge established power structures and narratives. Yet its democratic power is mired in a fundamentally undemocratic paradox of control. Control of the platforms used to express these voices is exercised by individuals and committees who make opaque decisions about content moderation and the boundaries of free speech behind closed doors. Governments too have a great interest in influencing these decisions to maintain some degree of control over public discourse2. The democratic power of the internet, then, is to a degree dictated by the oft-undemocratic institutions that exercise control over the public square. An example of these conflicting interests in action may be had in Twitter’s recent throttling of dissenting anti-establishment voices in Turkey ahead of their presidential elections, affecting its democratic potential.
Such instances call into question the legitimacy of online censorship and its degree. While it’s tempting to advocate relinquishing control entirely, online platforms without content moderation tend to skew towards hate and disinformation, still amplifying some narratives and silencing other less powerful ones. Provocative content drives engagement, and misinformation spreads too fast for traditional media to refute or correct. Particularly egregious instances of misinformation can impact public order and the rule of law. These may range from slight, such as misinformation about a riot in Kolkata (there was in fact only a slight road blockade), to more insidious harms where online platforms may become a powerful took to mobilize against the state itself, exemplified in protests like the Brazilian Free Pass protests or many acts of resistance during the Arab spring3.
The Need for a Regulatory Framework
A well-functioning public square presumes some degree of content moderation to combat this. The boundary between effective moderation and censorship on online platforms may sometimes be seen as arbitrary. Still, an effective and consistent framework for the same would be conducive and desirable for the long-term health of public discourse in a liberal democracy. Another consideration would be the role of the government in determining the same, with a view to forestall potential threats to national interest while employing caution not to be overzealous in suppressing democratic freedom and legitimate dissent. A comprehensive policy to regulate online social interactive platforms would likely require the formulation of a consistent theory of harm and alignment between the government and private platform owners, thus minimizing ad hoc decision-making in the content moderation process.
According to current Indian law, the government is empowered to issue takedown directives in accordance with the IT act, which states in section 69A that the state may block access to information that is deemed to threaten the sovereignty or defense of India, threaten law and order, or affect its relations with foreign states. In practice, however, the Indian state has often exceeded its ambit and issued directives seemingly out of scope. Takedown requests have been issued over tweets cited as fake news or disinformation or those judged anti-India or related to Pakistan. These include tweets about the Indian variant of Covid-19, tweets expressing support for the farmers’ or CAA protests, or those expressing concerns about perceived human rights violations in the Kashmir region. Further, the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Ethics Code) Rules policy (henceforth IT Rules) mandates that online interactive media platforms also maintain traceability and first originator data, allowing for not just the blocking of undesirable information, but the tracing of the backend user, bypassing any encryption measures employed to prevent the same.
The problem is twofold in that it tries to do too much with too little. On one hand, section 69A which forms the backbone of takedown policy is nebulous and imprecise, not going far enough to provide a comprehensive theory of harm or a consistent harm principle. When combined with the IT Rules policy it also allows for the exercise of power without accountability or transparency, or an adequate grievance redressal mechanism to deal with false positives. On the other, the lack of these frameworks allows the state to apply these policies liberally to justify takedowns that are wide and varied, and often seemingly at odds with constitutional freedoms of speech and privacy.
To address the seeming discrepancy between provision and power, the state should consider the formulation of a well-defined theory of harm in consultation with stakeholders and civil society organizations. Such a policy would take into account constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and expression and its limitations, the practical realities of the impact of subversive content, as the capabilities of various stakeholders involved in the process of moderation. A consistent harm principle would then bolster government and platform partnership, and build trust between platforms, people, and their government. The current ad hoc model of moderation may often infringe on liberal democratic freedoms, and is transacted undemocratically in seemingly antagonistic fashion. The absence of a theory of harm incentivizes sweeping measures like internet shutdowns, a phenomenon so commonplace in India it accounts for around 60% of the world’s total.
Formulating a Theory of Harm
It’s imperative that we work towards a consistent theory of harm to build better relationships between citizens, platforms, and governments in radically networked societies where online public squares have the power to spark organic movements and rapid decentralized organization. Such an updated theory of harm would have three key objectives –
Identification of potential grey areas that blur the line between democratic freedom and threats to the nation.
Identifying different levels of threats and appropriately scaffolded responses, mitigating the need for sweeping measures like shutdowns.
Rationalizing existing criteria for takedowns under the IT act.
Developing and implementing such a policy, in concert with platform owners and civil society organizations, would aim to ameliorate the worrying trend of social media takedown requests and internet shutdowns growing increasingly frequent, reconciling the need to preserve regional peace and security with constitutional freedoms of speech and expression. It is imprudent for IT law to remain stagnant for law in a radically networked society, as the needs of today are divergent with the needs of the past.
To sum up, we contend that the existing regulatory framework is insufficient for the effective management of digital rights and physical security. They create an adversarial environment that often pits the state, platform, and consumer against each other, compromising efficient in the process. There therefore arises a need in a radically networked society for a clear and consistent theory of harm that is better suited for the divergent needs of the present. We thus hope that in creating such a framework, the state may be better prepared to manage regional peace and security, while retaining the trust and partnership of its citizens and platform holders.
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