#113 Rockets that Return
In this edition of Technopolitik, that is coincidentally on all things space, Ashwin Prasad sheds light on the potential of reusable heavy lift rockets. Sridhar Krishna follows, with a piece on the debate about how satellite spectrum should be allocated. Finally, in this week’s curated section, Lokendra Sharma writes on space debris.
Technology has become important not just in our everyday lives, but has also become an arena for contestation among major powers including India. The Takshashila Institution has designed the 'Technopolitik: A Technology Geopolitics Survey' to understand and assess what people think about how India should navigate high-tech geopolitics. We are sure you are going to love the questions! Please take this 5-minute survey at the following link: https://bit.ly/technopolitik_survey
Antarikshmatters: The Imperative for Reusable Spacecraft
— Ashwin Prasad
SpaceX is set to end the year with four test flights of its most powerful rocket, the Starship. Each of the test flights pushed the envelope in terms of Starship's reusability. The fifth flight test preserved the rocket's first stage by catching it back on the same tower it launched from. As spectacular as this was to watch, why go to the trouble?
A month prior to this flight test, the Union Cabinet greenlit the development of ISRO's next big rocket, the Next Generation Launch Vehicle (NGLV). Its headline feature - its ability to carry heavier loads and be reusable. Various space agencies and corporations around the world are chasing reusable heavy-lift rocket capabilities. What makes these characteristics so important? There are a few reasons.
First, there is a greater range of possibilities. While the ultimate goal is to tap into the resources in space to sustain space missions, humanity will rely on resources from Earth for the foreseeable future. This means carrying what we need from Earth's surface for each mission. Heavy-lift rockets can carry more, both in terms of size and weight.
Second, launch costs and cadence. All of ISRO's rockets in use today make one-way trips to space. After delivering their cargo, they burn up in the atmosphere or fall back as debris safely in the oceans. As the rockets get bigger and better, they will also get more expensive. Build times will also get longer. If the idea is to fly to space more frequently and more affordably, we cannot be making a new rocket for each trip. A more sustainable option is to do what we do with our other vehicles, like aeroplanes. By flying the rocket back with controlled descent, they can be reused, greatly reducing costs and time between launches.
The NGLV is slated to become operational in eight years. With India's ambitious milestones, including having a space station in orbit and eventually a crewed mission to the moon, the success of the NGLV's reusability and heavy-lift capabilities is key. In addition to the NGLV, the Department of Space should also award separate contracts to build other heavy-lift, reusable launch vehicles independently.
While NGLV will be an indigenous rocket for India's strategic autonomy, these other rockets can also result from foreign collaborations. Perhaps a few will fail for every attempt that finds success during the various development stages. However, even these failures will result in positive spillovers regarding technology diffusion, infrastructure, and talent. A flourishing space economy needs the ecosystem that emerges from these things.
The ideas in this article appeared originally as an opinion piece in the Hindu.
Antarikshmatters: Spectrum Allocation or Auction
— Sridhar Krishna
The Debate
There is a growing worldwide debate on whether satellite spectrum should be allocated administratively or auctioned by governments. While auctions of terrestrial spectrum have been the norm in most countries, the incumbent telecom players have been demanding that satellite spectrum too should be similarly auctioned. SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Kuiper have, on the other hand, been claiming that satellite spectrum is different and auctions will not be in the public interest. They want it to be administratively allocated to different players. This paper attempts to understand the difference and review the pros and cons of the two approaches.
Auction Method
In this method, after a competitive bidding process, a government sells spectrum licenses to the highest bidder. This ensures transparency and generates revenue for the government that it can use to deliver other services to the public. The spectrum is allotted to those who value it the most and is efficient in competitive markets.
Administrative Allocation method
Here, the government directly assigns spectrum licenses without an auction for a nominal fee. This provides flexibility especially in sectors with low competition. This is suitable for public services and in specialised sectors.
Governments’ stand
The government of India is a signatory to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). It has taken the stand to adopt the global standard of administrative allocation of satellite spectrum. The view is that satellite spectrum can be shared between multiple operators. Additionally, this will enhance connectivity to remote and currently underserved regions and improve the ability to make government services available to all.
Rivalrous and Excludable nature of terrestrial spectrum
Using a terrestrial frequency has high potential for signal interference. In this case, multiple users cannot use the same frequency band in close proximity at the same time without causing some kind of disruption due to overlapping signals. This is why terrestrial spectrum has licences granted for specific geographic locations to avoid signal interference and degradation of service quality.
Terrestrial spectrum also operates within national borders and makes it possible for governments to control its allocation and use. Terrestrial spectrum can be effectively contained by governments and exclusion mechanisms can be put in place.
This rivalrous and excludable nature of terrestrial spectrum makes auctions the most efficient way of granting licenses to telecom players for specific geographical areas.
Why is the satellite spectrum different?
Satellite spectrum is seen as different because the satellite signals are broadcast over vast areas and multiple receivers can access the same signal without diminishing its quality. In addition, satellite spectrum works across international boundaries and requires coordination by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to ensure global harmonisation.
Excluding and controlling access to satellite signals across national borders by countries is also seen as being difficult if not impossible.
While satellite spectrum is generally considered non-rivalrous and non-excludable, making it a public good, certain circumstances could make it exhibit characteristics of rivalry and excludability.
Can Satellite spectrum become rivalrous and excludable too?
As demand for satellite spectrum increases, the currently available spectrum could become insufficient, leading to competition among operators for the same frequency bands. This situation could create rivalry, where one operator's use of the spectrum limits the availability for another. Reliance Jio, for example, expresses concern that large satellite constellations like Starlink and Kuiper, with their vast capacities, could create a competitive disadvantage for local players once this happens.
Starlink and Kuiper suggest that future technological innovations could lead to more efficient utilisation of satellite spectrum, potentially increasing capacity and reducing any rivalry. However, technological progress could also make certain bands more desirable or efficient for specific services, potentially leading to increased competition and rivalry for those particular bands.
Regarding excludability, while currently difficult, future advancements in geofencing and encryption technology could enable greater and more precise control over access to satellite signals, making it easier to exclude unauthorised users within specific geographic areas. Governments could impose restrictions on access to satellite services or specific frequency bands for national security reasons or even to regulate content, thereby excluding certain users or services.
The limited availability of orbital slots may also indirectly create some level of excludability especially in the geostationary orbit. Satellite operators may desire specific orbital slots and compete for those slots with other operators. This can cause entry barriers to potential new entrants or at the least limit their operational capabilities. SpaceX and Amazon with their head start may end up with disproportionate power as early movers in this space.
Conclusion
It is acceptable in the author’s opinion, given the current state of demand for satellite spectrum and the level of maturity of the technology, to consider satellite spectrum as a public good and administratively allotted between different players. This would make spectrum available at low prices to all and even to remote locations which are currently underserved.
However it is also important for governments to track the growth in demand for satellite spectrum and advances in geofencing and encryption technologies, and make changes to their policy if they see the non-rivalrous and non-excludable nature of satellite spectrum shifting.
Space debris: Market creates, market solves?
— Lokendra Sharma
There are already close to 7000 Starlink satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO). This is ‘nearly two thirds of all active satellites orbiting Earth.’ But Elon Musk’s Starlink is more ambitious than that. They plan to have about 42000 satellites in orbit. Why? Because Starlink wants to be the market leader when it comes to beaming internet from the sky, across the globe. But Starlink is not alone. According to a CNBC report, ‘China is aiming for a similar scale and hopes to have around 38,000 satellites across three of its low earth orbit internet projects, known as Qianfan, Guo Wang and Honghu-3.’ Then there are players such as Amazon’s Project Kuiper and Europe-based Eutelsat OneWeb (in which India’s telecom company Airtel has invested) which plan to place thousands of more satellites.
But all these satellites have an age. Apart from the fact that these mega constellations lead to congestion in space and negatively impact astronomy, they also contribute to the wicked problem of space debris. According to the European Space Agency, ‘Earth's orbit is littered with defunct satellites, spent rocket components, and other pieces of space debris that represent a hazardous environment for current and future space missions.’ The debris problem has gained so much recognition that space organisations (both public and private) across the world are working on tackling the same. Apart from the usual suspects like Indian Space Research Organisation, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and SpaceX, a range of actors from Airbus to startups based out of Japan and India are engaged with the question of debris.
But can the global space market, which has contributed to this wicked problem, solve it too? The following paper by Ni et al. published in 2024 attempts to answer this:
Ni, Anna Ya, Maureen Mayala, and Faith Victoria Ni. 2024. “An exploration of market mechanisms to the wicked problem of space debris.” Risk, Hazards, & Crisis in Public Policy 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1002/rhc3.12317 (open access)
Technological solutions for space debris have been advanced over the years. After giving a brief overview of the debris problem, Ni et al. focus on these technological solutions, categorising them into those meant for protection, removal and reduction. Whipple shields and collision‐avoidance maneuvers are protective technologies; passivation of spacecraft and rocket bodies, change of orbit, electrodynamic tether with remover satellite, throw‐net, space‐based laser system, nucleating foam, inflatable braking device, and small‐satellite grappler are technologies for prevention and removal. However, Ni et al. argue that ‘[d]espite the development of technological solutions, the existing domestic and international space governance framework has had limited effectiveness at space debris mitigation.’
Ni et al.’s primary argument is that administrative mechanisms involving governments ‘require internationally shared and legally binding space policy, which will encounter significant juridical hurdles unlikely to be met in the foreseeable future.’ They instead argue for market-mechanisms for solving this wicked problem. Specifically, they propose four policy alternatives. First, cap-and-trade that borrows from the emissions trading system for tackling pollution and climate change. This solution will involve an international agency like the International Telecommunications Union setting a cap on debris that a single state could generate, and allow for the trading of unutilised permitted debris. Second, franchise agreement that borrows from waste management practices. This will involve setting up of ‘space debris‐removal business operating requirements’ by international institutions. Private companies can pay the franchise fees and make a profit by charging satellite companies for debris removal services. Third, a liability insurance market that ‘can influence behavior of individual space explorers and create incentives to reduce or even clean up space debris.’ Fourth, corporate social responsibility — which is the weakest but not completely unpromising of all the policy alternatives advanced.
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