0x0b India’s Semiconductor Manufacturing Breakthrough
(This article is cross-posted from the Anticipating the Unintended newsletter, edition #247)
On 29th Feb, nearly 25 months after the government launched an incentive programme to support an Indian semiconductor ecosystem, came the announcement that the union cabinet had approved its first proposal for a commercial chip fabrication facility in India. This milestone provides a good opportunity to reflect on India’s position in semiconductor manufacturing going ahead.
Looking Under the Hood
As of now, we only have one government press release in the public domain, which, by definition, is not detailed. We know from it that the government has green-lighted the establishment of India's first-ever commercial chip fabrication plant. Before this announcement, all we had were vague Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between consortia and governments. This is the first time a proposal has received a go-ahead from the India Semiconductor Mission, an independent business arm of MeitY, and subsequently from the government since a big chunk of the investment will come from the government.
It took this long because, unlike the previous attempts where the government promised reimbursements on revenue generated, this time around it is giving incentives on an equal footing even during the facility’s construction phase. Given the high stakes, the government understandably took its time to go over the technical and financial capabilities of interested consortia. It was insistent that the technical partner be an equity investor, not just a technology provider, like in the case of Suzuki’s partnership with Maruti. This capital investment support on an equal footing (pari passu basis) was a major commitment device. It indicated to investors that the government is serious this time and is putting money where its mouth is. This also signalled that with support at the highest levels, such projects wouldn’t face the tax, doing business, and trade policy troubles that other projects have to deal with in India. In other words, it is a classic, pro-business industrial policy.
As for the proposal, the lead investor is Tata Electronics Private Limited. The technology partner is a well-established manufacturer of legacy chips, Taiwan-based PSMC. PSMC ranks sixth on the foundry market-cap table, with a 2.3 per cent market share in 2021. The total investment is estimated at ₹91000 crores, and the location selected is Dholera in Gujarat. The fab will make chips at the 28-nanometre node, which is a mid-range all-rounder node of sorts. Chips made using this node can be found in processors of entry-level smartphones, automotive Electronic Control Units (ECUs), and consumer electronics.
Now, let’s analyse this information systematically. Consider the investment first. The union government scheme promises financial support up to 50 per cent of the project cost. Additionally, the Gujarat government promises up to 40 per cent of union government support. So, the investors by choice and Indian taxpayers by fait accompli are taking a huge financial risk here. What portion of the ₹91000 crores is classified as project costs isn’t clear to me yet. The industry benchmark for constructing a 28-nm fab is roughly $1 billion, i.e. a tenth of the promised investment.
As for the technology, the 28-nm node is a decent start. PSMC, unlike Foxconn, has done extensive contract chip manufacturing before. The chart below from Gartner indicates the market sizes at various nodes in 2021. Interestingly, nearly 50 per cent of foundry revenues for the big five contract manufacturers come from the so-called legacy nodes, i.e., chips with feature sizes greater than or equal to 28 nanometres. 28-nanometre segment by itself accounts for 13 per cent, and this is the market India’s first fab will target.
The third parameter is the location. The government wants to create Dholera Special Industrial Region (DSIR) as a world-class industrial city on the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor. That said, nothing significant exists in Dholera as of now. The nearest significant city is Ahmedabad, which is 2 hours (~120 km) away. The planned semiconductor assembly hub in Sanand is also about 100 km away. There isn’t an important port in the immediate vicinity either.
The Other Side of the Debate
With these details out of the way, let’s get to the analysis bit. I have come across four arguments against such a project.
One set of questions that’s often been asked is: shouldn’t India be importing chips instead of investing taxpayer money on one project? Why subsidise the making of chips; shouldn’t we wait until private investors organically decide to invest in this sector?
I’m sympathetic to this line of reasoning. The opportunity costs are not trivial. And it’s not as if the planned capacity of 50000 WSPM (wafer starts per month) will make India atmanirbhar in any case. India will still be dependent on imports of many other categories and kinds of chips, just like Taiwan, the US, and China still are.
Nevertheless, there are positive spillovers that this opposition misses. A nucleus of semiconductor manufacturing also attracts many other auxiliary industries, such as chemicals, logistics, and toolmaking.
The chipmaking process also has horizontal spillovers since the managerial, technical, and process know-how needed to run these complex plants is easily portable to other advanced manufacturing segments. Given these spillovers, governments have had a role in building virtually every single semiconductor manufacturing facility globally.
Then there are potential benefits on the trade side as well. Having international players as equity partners in a project that operates in a hyperglobalised supply chain forces the government to integrate and reduce trade barriers.
There are also national security considerations at play. The absence of the know-how for running commercial chip fabrication is a critical vulnerability. Sure, a 28-nanometre fab will not make India’s defence platforms less dependent on foreign chips right off the bat. However, that might happen over a couple of decades. As we discussed in the previous edition, governments are beginning to consider enforcing export controls through on-chip mechanisms. So it makes sense to build more in-house chip manufacturing capabilities over time.
Finally, the value addition at the chip manufacturing stage now marginally exceeds that of the chip design stage. To be sure, these numbers might be skewed by the value added for the most advanced chips. But the point remains that chip manufacturing is no longer a commoditised, low value-add job. Process and product innovations in this segment have significantly increased the value-addition in this segment of the supply chain.
Any cost-benefit analysis should take the above factors into account as well.
A second opposition I’ve heard is that this segment will not generate significant employment, so why should the government even bother? To which I reply that employment intensity is only one of the factors that governments need to consider. If we were to take this argument to the extreme, the government should never have had a nuclear or space programmes. Certain industries disproportionately impact the quality of talent in the country rather than the sheer quantity of workers, and semiconductor manufacturing is one of them.
A third opposition is cencerned with the technology node in question. Why waste time and energy in working on the 28-nanometre, which would have fallen even further back from the cutting edge by the time the fab comes up three-four years from now? To this, I respond that India is a long way away from competing at the cutting-edge. 28-nanometre will continue to have reasonable base demand even a decade from now, and it’s costs are significantly lower than that of a cutting-edge fab. Moreover, countries with richer experience of making chips are already wooing the likes of TSMC with far higher incentives; so it makes sense to walk before running. This is a thirty-year marathon, and India has just about arrived at the starting line.
A final opposition concerns resources. Do we have the water to run a fab? Should a water-scarce country like India make chips? This is frankly a povertarian idea. Building a fab in one location in India doesn’t require fixing all of India’s water problems. There are droughts even in Taiwan and yet they do make the world’s best chips. If anything, a world-class fab will create incentives for better industrial demand mangement. Note that no big river flows through Dholera. The Sabarmati river, about 50 km away, is the nearest freshwater source. And yet, investors chose this site.
What Next?
Well begun is half done, but India hasn’t even begun just yet. The crucial step would be to ensure that the construction begins and completes soon. Here, the examples of the two recent attempts by TSMC in Japan and the US are instructive. The $8 billion Kumamoto plant in Japan has come up at a breakneck pace within two years, while the two TSMC projects in Arizona are stuck due to delays in subsidy payouts and labour union protests. The story in India is likely to follow the American trajectory rather than the Japan one. This is where the danger lies.
Perhaps the most significant challenge would be to transform the Dholera town into a vibrant city. Cities are not just buildings; they are complex systems requiring many things to fall in place. Good schools for children, work opportunities for spouses, pubs for a good evening drink (oh, wait it’s Gujarat!), are just some of the elements that go into making a city that can attract talent. With Dholera being what it is (check it out on Google Earth), I don’t see it becoming a vibrant city anytime soon. Ahmedabad will be where most employees will stay for the next few years. That’s another reason why the government shouldn’t put all eggs in one basket with this project. It is equally useful to consider greenlighting other low-volume specialised chip manufacturing project proposals that aim to build in more vibrant places like Mysuru and Coimbatore.
Finally, once the fab comes up, the proof of success will be the ability to produce chips at globally competitive prices. Not all of these chips will be consumed within India. This would still require pro-market reforms such as streamlining trade, tax, labour, and business policies. If that doesn’t happen, the government will resort to local sourcing mandates and import substitution in the name of atmanirbharta. This will increase the prices of many electronic products. The consumer will pay twice over—first as a taxpayer financing the fab and then as a consumer buying costlier outputs.
Chip manufacturing is a long journey and India has taken the first half-step.